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FRE-Bird: An Evidentiary Tale of Two
Colliding Copyrights
Daniel Abowd*
Sound recordings are not musical compositions. Sound recordings embody musical compositions. Thus, when sound recordings
appear in musical composition infringement trials, they do so as an
imperfect facsimile of the composition they actualize. As a
result, they can confuse and mislead juries tasked only with evaluating the similarity of the underlying composition. On the other
hand, music is an aural medium: how can juries be expected
to compare two songs without listening to their commercial
embodiments?
Several recent cases have hinged on the admissibility of sound
recordings in composition infringement trials. In doing so, they have
implicated three fundamental questions: (1) Where does composition end and sound recording begin? (2) How has the evolution of
creative and business practices in the music industry complicated the formerly tidy separation of composition and perfor-
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mance/recording? (3) What are the policy implications for courts
defining “composition” more broadly or more narrowly, and how
do these interact with the underlying policies governing sound recording evidentiary decisions?
This Note targets a seemingly simple question: how should
courts approach the use of sound recordings in composition
infringement trials? Any thorough answer, however, must grapple
with the many underlying creative, industry, and public policy complexities that bear on that debate. Thus, this Note necessarily traces
the historical convergence of composition and recording in creative,
industry, and judicial contexts. It then discusses the underlying
policy arguments that favor and oppose the unrestricted use of
sound recordings in composition infringement trials. Finally, it
marshals all of this context into a proposed “Triad” judicial framework that explicitly links a court’s inquiry into the “compositionality” of a recorded element to litigants’ burdens in seeking to
admit, or preclude, that element as evidence of substantial similarity
among compositions.
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A DAY IN THE LIFE: INTRODUCTION
There was a moment when Robin Thicke and Pharrell
Williams were clearly going to win. Amid the torrent of popular and
scholarly writing debating the Blurred Lines verdict1 and
its survival in the Ninth Circuit,2 that moment has been largely muffled by the din surrounding the reality that Thicke and Williams (the
“Thicke Parties”) did not, in fact, win. But the moment existed, and
for that forgotten snapshot in time, their adversaries were doomed.
In what was described as a “huge victory”3—an “unblurred victory”4—for the Thicke Parties, with “devastating consequences”5
for the Marvin Gaye estate, the district court ruled that the commercially released sound recording of “Got to Give It Up” by Marvin
1

Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL
4479500, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Williams v.
Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Williams v.
Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018). The jury found Thicke and Williams, but not cowriter/rapper Clifford Harris a/k/a T.I., liable for infringement. Id. The district court
overruled the jury’s finding of no liability for T.I. Id.
2
Williams, 895 F.3d at 1116 (primarily affirming on “narrow grounds” the district
court’s ruling, while reversing the district court’s decision to override the jury’s verdict in
favor of T.I.).
3
Marvin Gaye ‘Got to Give It Up’ Recording Barred From ‘Blurred Lines’ Trial,
ABC7 (Jan. 27, 2015), https://abc7.com/entertainment/marvin-gaye-got-to-give-it-uprecording-barred-from-blurred-lines-trial/492597/ [https://perma.cc/R6RW-QMHV].
4
Nancy Dillon, Marvin Gaye’s ‘Got to Give It Up’ Will Not Be Played For Jurors
During ‘Blurred Lines’ Copyright Trial, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 27, 2015, 1:45 PM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/music/jurors-not-hear-marvin-gaye-songblurred-lines-trial-article-1.2093741 [https://perma.cc/4GDZ-AV45].
5
Eriq Gardner, Marvin Gaye Family Seeks ‘Blurred Lines’ Appeal, Warns of
“Devastating Consequences” of Key Ruling (Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 29,
2015, 3:15 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/marvin-gaye-family-seeksblurred-768223 [https://perma.cc/J6EJ-HFSV].
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Gaye could not be played for the jury whose role it would be to
determine whether the Thicke Parties’ 2013 number one hit
“Blurred Lines” had infringed Gaye’s 1977 masterpiece.6 For an infringement claim less grounded in melodic and lyrical similarities,
and more reliant on the kind of “stylistic similarities” native to the
recording, and not reflected in the sheet music, this really mattered.7
Without hearing the recording, jurors would not be allowed to consider the many performance, production, and arrangement elements
that made the two records sound so alike.
The Gaye estate scrambled together an interlocutory appeal8 of
the ruling: “[We] do not believe that a truly fair trial can take place
if the jury cannot hear and compare both songs.”9 The district court
denied the motion.10 At that point, victory for the Thicke Parties was
all but assured—per conventional wisdom, anyway.
In fact, the court had already subtly walked back its ban of the
“Got to Give It Up” commercial recording. Its revised ruling
allowed “edited sound recordings” in which certain elements had
been digitally removed.11 Less than two months later, twelve jurors
who had never heard—in court, at least—the commercial version of
“Got to Give It Up,” found the Thicke Parties liable for
infringement.12 A few years later, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
jury’s findings.13

6

Final Pretrial Conference at 1, Williams v. Bridgeport Music Inc., No. 2:13–CV–
06004 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013), ECF No. 226.
7
See Allen Madison & Paul Lombardi, Blurred Justice, 39 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 145,
193 (2019); Jennifer Jenkins, The “Blurred Lines” of Law, CTR. FOR STUDY PUB. DOMAIN,
https://web.law.duke.edu/cspd/blurredlines/ [https://perma.cc/SY8Z-KX3T].
8
Counter-Claimaints’ Ex Parte Application for Continuance of Trial, Reconsideration
of Granting Motion in Limine No. 1–3 and Certification of Question for Interlocutory
Appeal, Williams v. Bridgeport Music Inc., No. 2:13–CV–06004 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15,
2013), ECF. No. 232.
9
Dillon, supra note 4.
10
See (In Chambers) Order Re Defendants’ Ex Parte Application for Continuance of
Trial, Reconsideration of Granting Motion in Limine No. 1–3 and Certification of Question
for Interlocutory Appeal, Williams v. Bridgeport Music Inc., No. 2:13–CV–06004 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 15, 2013), ECF No. 251.
11
Id.
12
Williams, 2015 WL 4479500, at *1.
13
Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1116 (9th Cir. 2018).
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Over the past half-decade, music industry rhetoric surrounding
copyright infringement litigation has intensified.14 That heightened
pitch can largely be traced to March 10, 2015, the date of the Blurred
Lines verdict.15 It has not subsided: similarly controversial decisions
have been rendered in infringement proceedings involving hits by
Led Zeppelin16 and Katy Perry,17 in the wake of a seemingly everswelling deluge of infringement complaints.18

14

See, e.g., Ben Sisario, ‘Blurred Lines’ Lawyer Rocks Music Industry Again, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/business/media/blurredlines-lawyer-rocks-music-industry-again.html [https://perma.cc/XGQ4-R37U].
15
See id.; Eriq Gardner, ‘Blurred Lines’ Trial Verdict: Jury Rules Against Pharrell
Williams & Robin Thicke, BILLBOARD (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.billboard.com/
articles/news/6495159/blurred-lines-trial-verdict [https://perma.cc/3L2L-X2C6]; see also
Joseph P. Fishman, Music as a Matter of Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1865 (2018) (“It’s
tough to overstate the amount of controversy that the case has generated.”). “Blurred Lines”
has garnered controversy along multiple fronts. For discussion of the song’s lyrical sex and
consent issues, see Pharrell Says He’s Embarrassed by “Blurred Lines,” GQ (Oct. 14,
2019), https://www.gq.com/story/pharrell-embarrassed-by-blurred-lines [https://perma.cc/
U92F-EALR]; Elizabeth Plank, Robin Thicke’s Sexism Isn’t “Blurry,” SALON (July 27,
2013),
https://www.salon.com/2013/07/27/blurred_lines_is_clearly_sexist_partner/
[https://perma.cc/XS8D-9HUX]; Julie Beck, When Pop Culture Sells Dangerous Myths
About Romance, ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/
archive/2018/01/when-pop-culture-sells-dangerous-myths-about-romance/549749/
[https://perma.cc/36MN-HWNR].
16
See Stairway to Court: US Judges Order New Led Zeppelin Plagiarism Trial,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2018, 9:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2018/sep/28/
led-zeppelin-plagiarism-taurus-spirit-stairway-to-heaven-new-trial
[https://perma.cc/
M4LQ-SML6]; see also Daniel Sanchez, 123 Artists File an Amicus Brief in Led
Zeppelin’s Closely Watched ‘Stairway to Heaven’ Lawsuit, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Aug. 2,
2019), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2019/08/02/led-zeppelin-amicus-brief/ (nonarchivable website); Jon Blistein, A New Led Zeppelin Court Win Over ‘Stairway to
Heaven’ Just Upended a Copyright Precedent, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 9, 2020, 3:45 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/led-zeppelin-stairway-to-heavencopyright-infringement-ruling-appeal-964530/ [https://perma.cc/5DF7-TDJ7].
17
See, e.g., Jem Aswad, Katy Perry and Co-Writers Call ‘Dark Horse’ Decision a
‘Travesty of Justice’, VARIETY (Aug. 2, 2019), https://variety.com/2019/music/news/katyperry-and-co-writers-call-dark-horse-decision-a-travesty-of-justice-1203290191/
[https://perma.cc/F37V-SWKV]; Eriq Gardner, Judge Wipes Out $2.8M Copyright Verdict
against Katy Perry, Capitol Records, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Mar. 17, 2020, 4:26 PM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/judge-wipes-28m-copyright-verdict-katyperry-capitol-records-1285141 [https://perma.cc/5JAB-XX8F].
18
See Music Copyright Infringement Resource, GW LAW BLOGS, https://blogs.
law.gwu.edu/mcir/cases/ [https://perma.cc/B2SU-JHX5]; Bill Donahue, 2016: The Year
the Music Sued, LAW360 (Jan. 13, 2017, 5:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
880127/2016-the-year-the-music-sued [https://perma.cc/5JGF-TLUD]. Some have
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Lurking beneath disagreements on the merits of each case are a
number of ongoing larger, even existential, debates that strike at the
underlying purposes of copyright, the legal identity of the musical
“composition,” and the proper methods by which such works ought
to be dissected in court. These discussions are not new. Yet, the specific procedural and substantive postures of recent high-profile cases
have triggered a glut in both popular and scholarly discussion surrounding the eminently technical idiosyncrasies of music copyright
litigation.19
This Note seeks to distill from that glut a seemingly simple question: how should courts approach the use of sound recordings in
composition infringement trials? The simplicity of this framing is
misleading, however. It is impossible to adequately answer this
question without confronting another: how can one determine what
is a probative (or misleading) representation of a musical composition without first defining the border between composition and
recording? Accordingly, this Note outlines the various creative, industry, and public policy nuances that affect these two inseparable
inquiries.
Seeking to best navigate these complexities, this Note’s
proposed Triad approach explicitly acknowledges the symbiosis between the formal “composition” doctrinal discussion and the functional evidentiary debate, and purposefully marries the two. It forges
a middle-ground compromise that respects songwriters’ narrow,
consensus view of what constitutes a composition, while also heeding the increased blurriness between composition and recording.
The proposed three-step Triad approach begins with a judicial inquiry into (1) the “compositionality” of a recorded element
offered into evidence. It proposes a suite of non-dispositive factors
to guide the compositionality inquiry, and then leverages that

speculated that the flood will subside in the wake of the recent prominent and defendantfriendly Led Zeppelin and Katy Perry outcomes. See Ben Sisario, The ‘Blurred Lines’ Case
Scared Songwriters. But Its Time May Be Up., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/24/arts/music/blurred-lines-led-zeppelincopyright.html [https://perma.cc/ZPF7-ZZGM]; see also Jonathan Bailey, Burying Blurred
Lines, PLAGIARISMTODAY (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2020/04/07/
burying-blurred-lines/ [https://perma.cc/K2HW-UAZF].
19
See, e.g., infra notes 238, 264, 274 and accompanying text.
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finding to allocate the burden for (2) introducing or (3) precluding
recorded elements embodying the material in question.
This Note does not evaluate whether specific cases were rightly
or wrongly decided, nor does it apply doctrine to ongoing proceedings in an effort to predict or promote an outcome based on any interpretation of the law as it exists today. Rather, this Note adopts a
history- and policy-driven search for clarity: how can courts
balance creative and industry perspectives with evolving realities in
order to facilitate future creativity and promote consistent,
predictable justice?
This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I explores the history
of the two music copyrights (composition and sound recording), the
creative practices they promote, and their gradual convergence
along both creative and business dimensions. Part II examines
how this convergence has been reflected in the courts. Building
upon this historical background, Part III articulates the policy implications surrounding different approaches to defining musical compositions and the use of sound recordings in infringement proceedings involving those compositions. Finally, Part IV shepherds these
historical and policy complexities into a judicial approach that
allows courts the stability and flexibility to best promote both judicial and creative clarity.
I. BORDERLINE: THE HISTORICAL CONVERGENCE OF
COMPOSITION AND SOUND RECORDING
Musical compositions and sound recordings form two discrete
pieces of intellectual property. Any single composition may be embodied in an infinite number of separate sound recordings. To illustrate, the composition “Yesterday,” written by Paul McCartney and
John Lennon, has been recorded thousands of times.20 Each of those
sound recordings constitutes a separate piece of intellectual property
(e.g., “Yesterday” as recorded by Gladys Knight & The Pips,
or “Yesterday” as recorded by Marvin Gaye, or “Yesterday” as

20

Most Recorded Song, GUINNESS WORLD RECORDS, https://web.archive.org/web/
20060910071729/http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/content_pages/record.asp?recor
did=50867 [https://perma.cc/VFA4-ADT9].
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recorded by The Beatles). But each separate recording embodies the
same single composition: the song “Yesterday,” as written by Paul
McCartney and John Lennon.21
The delineation between these two basic widgets of musical creativity is foundational to the modern music industry. Fundamentally,
the sound recording and composition copyrights comprise two
wholly distinct intellectual assets, governed by distinct regulatory
schemes, judicial doctrines, and industry infrastructures.22 While
federal copyright law in the United States has provided for the
protection of musical compositions since 1831,23 Congress did not
extend copyright protection to sound recordings until 1972—nearly
a hundred years after Thomas Edison first secured a patent for the
invention of the phonograph.24 This sound recording copyright is
bound by the literal performance as actually reflected on the recording, and is endowed in the performers of the music.25 Meanwhile,
the composition copyright applies to the underlying piece of songwriting and is endowed in the authors of the song.26 The rights of
one do not extend to the other.27
21

Yesterday, ASCAP: ACE REPERTORY, https://www.ascap.com/repertory#ace/search/
workID/550055368 [https://perma.cc/34HW-DN7C].
22
See T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575, 1576 n.1 (D.N.J. 1987).
23
Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436–38; see also Lydia Pallas Loren,
Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 679 (2003).
24
See History of the Cylinder Phonograph, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.
gov/collections/edison-company-motion-pictures-and-sound-recordings/articles-andessays/history-of-edison-sound-recordings/history-of-the-cylinder-phonograph/
[https://perma.cc/XVD4-2SL5]; see also Loren, supra note 23, at 686 (“This new layer of
copyright protection is separate from the protection granted to any musical work that may
also be reproduced in a sound recording. The sound recording copyright protects the
elements of original authorship that inhere in a sound recording, whether it is a recording
of a musical performance, the reading of a book, or the sounds of railroad whistles.”).
25
See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012) (extending sound recording protection to “the actual
sounds fixed in the recording”). Courts have interpreted this to preclude any authorized
taking of any portion of the sound recording. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension
Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005); 1 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.10
(2019).
26
See Jamie Lund, An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test in Music
Composition Copyright Infringement, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 137, 146 (2011);
Fishman, supra note 15, at 1884.
27
See Lucille M. Ponte, The Emperor Has No Clothes: How Digital Sampling
Infringement Cases Are Exposing Weaknesses in Traditional Copyright Law and the Need
for Statutory Reform, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 524 (2006).
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In practice, the precise border separating the two copyrights can
be significantly blurrier than this simple overview might suggest. To
be sure, the bounds of the recording copyright are easy enough to
define: only literal sounds taken from the actual recording are protected.28 Even the most convincing sonic mimicry does not infringe
a sound recording copyright.29 By stark contrast, however, the
bounds of the composition are not nearly so conspicuous. This ambiguity, along with its doctrinal and practical significance, will be
explored in depth beginning in Part II of this Note.
First, though, in order to understand contemporary confusion
around the role sound recordings play in defining the compositions
they embody and why that issue is crescendoing today, it is imperative to track the separate—but increasingly overlapping—history of
both forms of musical creativity. Accordingly, Part I of this Note
traces the historical origins of the foundational dichotomy between
composition and sound recording. Part I.A focuses on the era before
the invention and widespread adoption of recorded music. Part I.B
discusses the rise of recorded music and the initial separation of the
music industry’s compositional and recording silos. Parts I.C and
I.D document two modern creative developments that have significantly obscured the boundaries between composition and sound
recording: the commingling of individual creative roles, and the
merging of the creative processes associated with composition and
production. Finally, Parts I.E and I.F explore two business practices
that inform the industry’s own conception of the composition:
modern songwriter share allocation and the rise of sampling.
A. Before Recorded Music
The tidy formal border between sound recordings and the compositions they embody derives directly from the real-world creative
delineations that existed throughout most of the first century of U.S.
copyright governance.30 For most of that period, spanning from the
28
See Melissa Eckhause, Digital Sampling v. Appropriation Art: Why Is One Stealing
and the Other Fair Use? A Proposal for A Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Digital
Music Sampling, 84 MO. L. REV. 371, 400 (2019).
29
See id.; Joanna Demers, Sound-Alikes, Law, and Style, 83 UMKC L. REV. 303 (2014).
30
Robert Brauneis, Musical Work Copyright for the Era of Digital Sound Technology:
Looking Beyond Composition and Performance, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2–3
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original Copyright Act of 179031 through the nineteenth century,
recorded music did not exist.32 Musical works were authored
by composers and notated visually for use by performers.33 The
dominant commercial format was sheet music, which conveyed
notes, rhythms, lyrics, and other stylistic cues to the performer.34
The Copyright Act of 1831,35 the first to extend protection to
musical compositions, reflected this relatively simple creative and
industry configuration.36
Contemporary conceptions of the composition placed particular
emphasis on melody, as notated in the sheet music. This “outsized
importance” of melody in Western musical culture stemmed from
compositional norms of the pre-record era.37 At that time, “[t]he
usual compositional process was first to create music at the piano
and then subsequently orchestrate it.”38 The resulting cultural “subordination of timbre to pitch” would survive centuries of creative
and industry upheaval.39

(2014) (characterizing the first “150 years” of United States copyright law as construing
music as a “two-stage art of [protected] composition and [unprotected] performance.”).
“Composition—a deliberative activity that allowed rethinking and editing—produced a
score, a stable, visually perceptible representation of melody, harmony, and rhythm that
used a system of mostly discrete notation.” Id. Performance, then, constituted a “real-time,
low-deliberation, no-editing activity that was evanescent, unrepeatable, purely aural, and
continuous.” Id.
31
Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124–26.
32
See Loren, supra note 23, at 686.
33
See id. at 679.
34
See Peter Lee, Reconceptualizing the Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Shaping
Industry Structure, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1248 (2019). Initially, even after the rise of
recorded music, the preeminence of sheet music continued. See Charles Cronin, Seeing Is
Believing: The Ongoing Significance of Symbolic Representations of Musical Works in
Copyright Infringement Disputes, 16 COLO. TECH. L.J. 225, 226 (2018).
35
Copyright Act of 1897, ch. 392, 29 Stat. 694.
36
See Loren, supra note 23, at 679–81 (observing that the Act did not grant authors
exclusive reproduction or public performance rights; it merely afforded them protection
against unauthorized copying of their written reductions).
37
Fishman, supra note 15, at 1875–77 (tracking the ways in which, historically,
“[melody’s] primacy begot property.”).
38
Id. at 1875.
39
Id. at 1875–77 (outlining a “dichotomy that continues to influence music copyright
today: those who create new melodies are artists, while those who recontextualize those
melodies are mere craftsmen.”).
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In the early twentieth century, new means of reproducing and
distributing musical works emerged. First came self-playing piano
rolls, whose advent triggered a reckoning of federal licensing laws;
the Copyright Act of 190940 again positioned the composition as
equivalent to the written score.41 Although piano rolls would quickly
become the first of many formerly prominent, effectively obsolete
twentieth-century music technologies, copyright law’s fixation on
the written score would continue to govern a new non-written
format: recorded music.
B. Tin Pan Alley
Neither piano rolls, nor the first half-century of recorded music
did much to change the incumbent separation of the composition and
performance processes. For much of the twentieth century, composition was understood to be a thoroughly self-contained exercise. As
a rule, the popular music supply chain featured a songwriting process whose entire life cycle began and ended prior to the performance/recording stage.42 This model was typified by the “Tin Pan
Alley” machine, wherein music publishers would employ composers and lyricists to create what were understood to be fully formed
compositions, and “song pluggers” to place those compositions with
popular recording artists and performers.43 Even as these stark
40

Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075–88.
See White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 11 (1908); Brauneis,
supra note 30, at 13 (“[White-Smith] reaffirmed the centrality of the score.”). In response
to White-Smith, Congress promptly endowed to rightsholders the exclusive right to
mechanical reproduction of media such as piano rolls or records. See id. Still, the Copyright
Act of 1909 only contemplated protection via “publication of visually perceptible copies
of that composition” or by “registration accompanied by deposit of a visually perceptible
copy.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL
1128808, at *6 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2020) (“Although the 1909 Act extended copyright
protection against infringement beyond the mere reproduction of the sheet music, Congress
did not provide that copyrighted works could be anything other than sheet music or, for an
unpublished work, the musical composition transcribed in the deposit copy.”).
42
See Shourin Sen, The Denial of A General Performance Right in Sound Recordings:
A Policy That Facilitates Our Democratic Civil Society?, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233, 246
(2007); see also America’s Music Publishing Industry: The Story of Tin Pan Alley,
PARLOR SONGS ACADEMY, http://parlorsongs.com/insearch/tinpanalley/tinpanalley.php
[https://perma.cc/3SGZ-8R3A].
43
See, e.g., Sen supra note 42, at 246. For additional context on music publishing, see
Shalini Sutharshana, A Brief History of Music Publishing, SONGTRUST (Apr. 3, 2018),
41
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dividing lines began to fade,44 iterations of this model remained
successful through the 1960s. Berry Gordy’s Motown enterprise
employed what Gordy considered an “assembly line for music,”45
where “[a]rtists performed, writers wrote, producers produced,”
instrumentalists played their instruments, pluggers plugged, and
so on.46
Thus, for the first half-century of marketed recorded music, the
predominant supply chain for the production of music was linear:
(1) composition (as conceived at the time: melody, harmony and lyrics) as a self-contained process; and (2) production, arrangement,
and performance. As a result, defining the scope of a composition
was simple: it was nothing more and nothing less than what the composer(s) had created during step one.
C. The Commingling of Songwriter, Producer, and Artist Roles
After centuries of siloed compositional and performance roles,
the walls started to crumble fairly quickly in the 1960s.47 Suddenly,
many of the decade’s most successful artists were penning their own
hits, including musicians as varied as Bob Dylan, Otis Redding,
Joan Baez, Paul Simon, Joni Mitchell, Dolly Parton, and Aretha

https://blog.songtrust.com/brief-history-of-the-music-publishing [https://perma.cc/A6Q97YJM].
44
See infra Part I.C.
45
See Helienne Lindvall, Behind the Music: Motown—a Pop Factory with Quality
Control, GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2010, 11:59 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/music/
musicblog/2010/nov/26/behind-music-motown-pop-factory
[https://perma.cc/FW8Q8L9V].
46
See Vince Carducci, Manufacturing Motown, POPMATTERS (Jan. 26, 2009),
https://www.popmatters.com/69384-manufacturing-motown-2496071565.html
[https://perma.cc/PF6E-ZXC5] (quoting Temptations leader Otis Williams).
47
There were exceptions. See, e.g., Christopher Reynolds, Documenting the Zenith of
Women Song Composers: A Database of Songs Published in the United States and the
British Commonwealth, CA. 1890–1930, 69 NOTES 671, 675 (2013) (documenting early
20th century women songwriters, including some who were also performers, such as Bessie
Smith); Ted Ownby, Jimmie Rodgers: The Father of Country Music, MISSISSIPPI HISTORY
NOW (July 2004), https://web.archive.org/web/20101007161643/http://mshistory.
k12.ms.us/articles/39/jimmie-rodgers-the-father-of-country-music
[https://perma.cc/AX58-QHP4]; Duke Ellington: The Composer, Pt. 1, NPR (Nov. 19,
2018, 10:16 AM), https://www.npr.org/2008/11/19/97193567/duke-ellington-thecomposer-pt-1 [https://perma.cc/CT99-DKJA].
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Franklin.48 This was mirrored by the emergence of rock bands, such
as The Beatles and The Rolling Stones, who played their own instruments and sang songs composed by group members.49 Meanwhile, Tin Pan Alley songwriters like Carole King and Neil Diamond became mainstream recording artists.50 By the end of the
1960s, even the rigid divisions at Motown began to dissolve: artists
whose talents extended beyond performance started to assert themselves as writers and producers.51 Chief among those artists were
Stevie Wonder and, significantly, Marvin Gaye.52
Also noteworthy was the convergence of the songwriting and
producing roles. As the purview of the record producer expanded
beyond its original bundle of talent scouting, business development,
and logistical responsibilities53 into a more influential creative position,54 it became more common for songwriters—including Ray

48

History: The Singer/Songwriter, BMI, https://www.bmi.com/genres/entry/history_
the_singer_songwriter [https://perma.cc/55XN-EGGH].
49
It was not normal when they started. See DAVID SHEFF, ALL WE ARE SAYING: THE
LAST MAJOR INTERVIEW WITH JOHN LENNON AND YOKO ONO 171 (St. Martin’s Griffin 1st
ed. 2000) (“Paul and I just went off in the corner of the room and finished [writing ‘I Wanna
Be Your Man’] while [members of the Rolling Stones, who would soon record the song]
were all still there talking. We came back and that’s how Mick and Keith got inspired to
write, because, ‘Jesus, look at that. They just went in the corner and wrote it and came
back!’”).
50
The “Brill Building Sound” Shaped Pop and Rock and Roll in the 60’s, MUSIC
ORIGINS PROJECT, https://www.musicorigins.org/item/the-brill-building-sound-shapedpop-and-rock-and-roll-in-the-60s/ [https://perma.cc/L7LT-DEAH].
51
See Francesca D’Amico, The Revolution Will Not Be Televised, But It Will Be
Recorded: Soul, Funk, and the Black Urban Experience, 1968–1979, in THE GLOBAL
SIXTIES IN SOUND AND VISION: MEDIA, COUNTERCULTURE, REVOLT 188 (T. Brown & A.
Lison eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2014).
52
See Charles Moss, What’s Going On: Marvin Gaye’s Liberation from the Motown
Sound, POPMATTERS (Jan. 28, 2009), https://www.popmatters.com/69381-whats-goingon-marvin-gayes-liberation-from-the-motown-sound-2496071599.html
[https://perma.cc/7R2L-6M8V]; Chris Williams, ‘I Thought He Was a Messenger’:
Making Stevie Wonder’s ‘Talking Book,’ ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2012), https://www.the
atlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/10/i-thought-he-was-a-messenger-makingstevie-wonders-talking-book/264182 [https://perma.cc/J79P-T3FC].
53
See Greg Kot, What Does a Record Producer Do?, BBC (Mar. 10, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20160310-what-does-a-record-producer-do
[https://perma.cc/QJ4A-F3AR].
54
See Randall Roberts, How George Martin’s Studio Tricks and Innovations Changed
Pop Music, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2016, 1:41 PM), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/
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Davies of The Kinks,55 Brian Wilson of The Beach Boys,56 and Norman Whitfield, Holland-Dozier-Holland, and Smokey Robinson of
Motown57—to serve in this capacity.
D. The Merging of Composition and Production
It may have been inevitable, once the barrier between composers
and performers eroded, that the neat delineation between composition and performance/production would soon follow. Relatively
early examples of the convergence of composition and recording
efforts include works such as “Birthday” by The Beatles,58 “Under
Pressure” by Queen and David Bowie,59 and much of the album Remain in Light by the Talking Heads,60 which were all composed at
least in part during the recording process. Decades before the rise of
modern sampling,61 Brian Wilson experimented with recording numerous “brief musical passages” and stitching them together into
new compositions.62 In one doctrinally consequential example,

music/posts/la-et-ms-how-george-martin-studio-tricks-beatles-changed-pop-music20160309-story.html [https://perma.cc/BR35-MTPA].
55
See Matt Frost, Ray Davies: Five Decades in the Studio, SOUND ON SOUND,
https://www.soundonsound.com/people/ray-davies
[https://perma.cc/S4X7-KRE9]
(discussing, with Davies himself, how the “ups and downs [arising] when a musician and
principal songwriter begins to move from being produced to being producer” interweaved
with his actual compositional process).
56
See Carl Wilson, The Beach Boys’ Brian Wilson: America’s Mozart?, BBC (June 9,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20150608-is-this-americas-mozart [https://
perma.cc/5H42-BSCR].
57
Rashad Grove, Got to Give it Up: 15 Songwriters and Producers That Shaped the
Motown Sound, UDISCOVERMUSIC (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.udiscovermusic.com/
stories/motown-sound-producers-and-songwriters [https://perma.cc/376T-W37U].
58
The White Album, BEATLES ULTIMATE EXPERIENCE, http://www.beatlesinterviews.
org/dba09white.html [https://perma.cc/Y4JN-8S3G].
59
See Josh Jones, The Making of Queen and David Bowie’s 1981 Hit “Under
Pressure”: Demos, Studio Sessions & More, OPEN CULTURE (June 16, 2014),
http://www.openculture.com/2014/06/the-making-of-under-pressure.html
[https://perma.cc/R8SQ-A8K2].
60
See Dave Simons, The Song or the Studio: Which Comes First?, BMI (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.bmi.com/news/entry/the-song-or-the-studio-which-comes-first
[https://perma.cc/NUR7-L82R].
61
See infra Part I.F.
62
See Simons, supra note 60.

2020]

FRE-BIRD

1327

George Clinton composed his allegedly infringed hit “Atomic Dog”
as he recorded it.63
This was a harbinger of norms to come. While the linear composition-then-recording supply chain of yore is not wholly extinct,64
modern pop music is dominated by a digital creative process that
merges composition with production.65 Digital recording technology has allowed for more democratized creation: it has become
common practice for producers to source arrangement and production elements from multiple collaborators through the sharing of
digital recording session files with other creators, including lyric and
melody writers (“topliners”), as well as other producers.66
Directly contrary to the traditional configuration, today “[i]n
commercial songwriting, the track virtually always comes first.”67
Often, producers will send out the same backing track68 to several
topliners, who then submit what are essentially competing melodic
63

See Brief of Defendants–Appellants at 29, Bridgeport Music v. Smelzgood Entm’t,
No. 07–5596, 2007 WL 5066300 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 2007). In a suit alleging infringement
of “Atomic Dog” by the group Public Announcement, Clinton’s publisher would use this
fact to (successfully) argue that composition and recording were equivalent. See infra notes
110, 173 and accompanying text.
64
It is still common in some genres, including modern country music. See, e.g., JOHN
SEABROOK, THE SONG MACHINE: INSIDE THE HIT FACTORY 200 (2015) (observing the
“spiritual” connection between Nashville and Tin Pan Alley).
65
See Brauneis, supra note 30, at 3 (explaining that in modern music creation, “the roles
of composer, musician, and producer are blurred as composition, performance, recording,
synthesizing, sequencing, sampling, editing, processing, and mixing are accomplished
iteratively and collaboratively,” and thus written reductions are “only approximations of
the recorded works.”).
66
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justice
Musician and Composers and Law, Music, and Business Professors in Support of
Appellees at 36, Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018) (arguing that modern
music creators birth compositions that are “purely aural and digital” such that “paper sheet
music notation itself is becoming an archaic, possibly obsolescent, format”).
67
Benjamin Samama, What’s the Difference Between a Songwriter and a Topline
Writer?, SONICBIDS BLOG (Mar. 2, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://blog.sonicbids.com/whats-thedifference-between-a-songwriter-and-a-topline-writer [https://perma.cc/2TRB-6JF7].
68
The term “backing track” refers to a sound recording’s produced instrumental
arrangement, which in western popular music typically accompanies the record’s lead
vocal track. See Alex Needham, John Seabrook on The Song Machine: “There’s a Dark
Side to Pop,” GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2011, 11:37 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
music/2015/nov/04/john-seabrook-song-machine-review-pop-music
[https://perma.cc/
W59E-GSRQ]; Backing Track, COLLINS DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/
us/dictionary/english/backing-track [https://perma.cc/PE3R-AYWW].
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and lyrical bids to complete the same unfinished song.69 Instead of
responding to pre-existing bundles of harmony, melody, and lyric,
today’s arrangement and production elements predate, and therefore
directly affect and inspire, the melodic and lyrical material that sits
atop them.70 Experts have dubbed this reversal a change from the
traditional “melody-and-lyrics” conception of songwriting, to the
modern “track-and-hook” model.71
E. The Evolution of Songwriter Splits
The convergence of the composition and recording processes
has spurred a shift in the predominant norms guiding the allocation
of songwriter splits—the primary way in which the music industry
defines compositional ownership and, by implication, the composition itself.72 Songwriter splits, or shares, refer to the percentage of

69
See Helienne Lindvall, Behind the Music: Why Topline Melody Writing Creates
Disputes Between Artists and Songwriters, GUARDIAN (Aug. 26, 2011, 8:38 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2011/aug/26/topline-melody-disputesartists-songwriters [https://perma.cc/Z594-W74U] (discussing the complications arising
from this practice). See also Needham, supra note 68 (reporting the “hot water” that
producer/writer Ryan Tedder found himself in when Kelly Clarkson “noticed that the song
he’d given her, Already Gone, was uncomfortably close to one he’d done with Beyoncé,
Halo.”).
70
Harmony is typically created as a part of the track production process, although
topliners and melody can play a role in shaping harmony. See generally SEABROOK, supra
note 64, at 189.
71
See id. at 200 (“[Track-and-hook] has largely replaced the melody-and-lyrics
approach to songwriting [from the] Tin Pan Alley era[] . . . . It is common practice for a
producer to send the same track to multiple topliners—in extreme cases, as many as 50—
and choose the best melody from among the submissions.”). The term “hook,” in this
context, broadly refers to a song’s primary vocal melodic material. See id. “Hook” is often
also used to describe specific load-bearing chunks of melody that songwriters center their
compositions around, such as a chorus or memorable repeated phrase. See Tom Cole, You
Ask, We Answer: What’s A Hook?, NPR (Oct. 15, 2010, 6:52 PM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/therecord/2010/10/15/130588663/you-ask-we-answer-what-s-a-hook
[https://perma.cc/N5AM-YD2H].
72
See Justin M. Jacobson, Are You Co-Writing Songs? A “Split Sheet” Just Isn’t
Enough, HYPEBOT (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2015/11/why-asongwriter-split-sheet-just-isnt-enough-draft.html
[https://perma.cc/6ZCT-SCHN];
Education, SONA, https://www.wearesona.com/education [https://perma.cc/C32KLGZ9].
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ownership allocated to each co-writer of a given musical work.73
Ownership may be divided equally among co-writers,74 but relative
adjustments may be made for a number of factors, including the extent of a co-writer’s contribution, a co-writer’s stature or seniority,
or a co-writer’s leverage.75 While any of these or other factors may
inform negotiations, there are no set rules governing share allocation. In reality, co-writers often do not even finalize shares until after
the commercial release of the sound recording embodying their
composition.76
Traditionally, it was customary to allocate 50% to the creation
of the lyrics and 50% to the creation of the accompanying music
(melody, harmony, and rhythm).77 This convention reinforced the
understanding that a composition was a self-contained bundle of
words and melody. Two modern changes have complicated this
practice. First, as the industry has largely shifted to a “Production +
Topline” model,78 songwriter share norms have followed: typically,
50% is now allocated to the creators of the backing track (generally
producers and musicians, who arrange, record, and produce a
recording’s instrumental bedrock) and 50% is allocated to “top-

73

See Helienne Lindvall, Calculating the Credits Behind Songwriting, GUARDIAN (June
24, 2008, 6:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2008/jun/24/
calculatingthecreditsbehind [https://perma.cc/SZ8K-QYK3].
74
This is the statutory default. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2018).
75
See Cottrill v. Spears, No. CIV.A. 02–3646, 2003 WL 21223846, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May
22, 2003), aff’d, 87 F. App’x 803 (3d Cir. 2004), as amended on reh’g (June 2, 2004);
Theodora Michaels, Agree On Your Songwriter Splits, HEVEDBURG MUSIC,
http://www.hevedburgmusic.com/article3.html [https://perma.cc/4GSU-EDNZ]; Patty
Way, Co-Writing Nashville Style, ENVATO TUTS+ (Feb. 12, 2013), https://music.
tutsplus.com/articles/co-writing-nashville-style—audio-16388
[https://perma.cc/4V9663QV].
76
See ASCAP, Welcome to Splitsville, USA—Where Co-Writers Live Together in
Harmony, YOUTUBE (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RaFZ_
Q40qWk&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/XN54-AJXY]; Lindvall, supra note 73.
77
See Richard Osborne, Doing the Splits: The Creative Accounting of Songwriting
Shares, IASPM UK & IRELAND CONFERENCE 2016: CREATIVITY, PRACTICE AND PRAXIS,
BRIGHTON 4–6 (2016) (noting that performing rights organization regulations codified this
approach).
78
See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
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liners” (writers of the melodic and lyrical material that sits atop the
backing track).79
Second, a broader coalition of music creators now enjoy access
to songwriter shares than was once the case. Traditionally, instrumentalists and producers, operating from the perspective that a composition was a complete and self-contained work prior to the recording process, would not typically have expected to attain songwriter
credit.80 This model became ubiquitous through the emergence of
rock bands that centered around songwriting partnerships like Lennon/McCartney and Jagger/Richards.81 This “all-or-nothing” approach to rock songwriter credits once again reinforced the notion
that composition was distinct from the arrangement, production, and
performance of a piece.
Today, instrumentalists, producers, and background vocalists
who contribute creative ideas to the arrangement, production, and
performance of a sound recording are much more likely to be credited as songwriters.82 Not coincidentally, the number of credited
songwriters per pop hit has consistently, and dramatically, increased
over the past several decades.83 While arguably reflecting a

79

See Donna-Claire Chesman, Drew Love Pulls Back the Curtain on What It Means to
Be a Songwriter in 2019, DJBOOTH (Apr. 16, 2019), https://djbooth.net/features/201904-16-drew-love-interview-songwriting-royalty-exchange
[https://perma.cc/H9P3NMYA]; Cliff Goldmacher, The Dos and Don’ts of Co-Writing, BMI (June 28, 2011),
https://www.bmi.com/news/entry/the_dos_and_donts_of_co-writing
[https://perma.cc/B9JR-WSC4]; Chris Robley, Should My Producer Get Publishing and
Songwriting Credit?, DIY MUSICIAN (July 11, 2018), https://diymusician.cdbaby.com/
music-rights/does-my-producer-deserve-publishing-and-songwriting-credit
[https://perma.cc/4PS4-XNQA].
80
See Mark Sutherland, Songwriting: Why It Takes More Than Two to Make a Hit
Nowadays, MUSIC WEEK (May 16, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.musicweek.com/
publishing/read/songwriting-why-it-takes-more-than-two-to-make-a-hit-nowadays/
068478 [https://perma.cc/UL76-4PZP] (remarking that today’s producers and musicians
are “more likely to be credited [as songwriters] for their contributions”).
81
See Osborne, supra note 77, at 4–6.
82
See Sutherland, supra note 80.
83
See Dorian Lynskey, How Many People Does It Take to Write a Hit Song in 2019?,
GQ (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/culture/article/long-songwritingcredits [https://perma.cc/7HNS-8AU5] (enumerating several other factors that have also
contributed to this trend); Dan Kopf, How Many People Take Credit for Writing a Hit
Song?,
PRICEONOMICS, https://priceonomics.com/how-many-people-take-credit-forwriting-a-hit-song [https://perma.cc/ZE8F-5QEW].
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reasonable business reward for creative effort, these trends significantly blur the distinction between compositional creativity and arrangement, production, or performance creativity.84
F. Sampling
Another modern practice that has obscured the composition/recording boundary is the rise of sampling.85 Typically, an artist or
producer samples by incorporating a portion of a pre-existing sound
recording into a new sound recording.86 Any given sample might
encompass melodic and lyrical elements,87 or, commonly, “groove”
elements such as a drum pattern.88 The borrowed material might permeate the majority of the new work,89 or it might be as fleeting as a
baby’s coo.90
84

Further blurring the lines between composition and recording is a practice that is
wryly characterized by songwriters as “change a word, get a third.” Successful artists,
leveraging songwriters’ willingness to barter an interest in their composition in exchange
for securing a prominent placement, are often able to negotiate a songwriter credit even
when they played no songwriting role. See Helienne Lindvall, Behind the Music: Credit
Where Credit’s Due, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2008, 9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
music/musicblog/2008/jan/23/ivealwaysstudiedthecredits [https://perma.cc/9J7P-TS9S].
85
See generally Eckhause, supra note 28.
86
Kevin Cornell, Music Sampling: Breaking Down the Basics, TUNECORE (Aug. 9,
2016),
https://www.tunecore.com/blog/2016/08/music-sampling-breaking-down-thebasics.html [https://perma.cc/D6NM-25AF]. Here, “sampling” is defined as taking from a
pre-existing sound recording, as distinct from the “interpolation” of a pre-existing
composition without using any embodying recorded material. See What Is the Difference
Between a Sample and Interpolation?, SONGTRUST, https://help.songtrust.com/knowledge/
what-is-the-difference-between-a-sample-and-interpolation
[https://perma.cc/5EA7V793].
87
See, e.g., Kanye West Feat. Rihanna and Swizz Beatz’s ‘Famous’ Sample of Sister
Nancy’s ‘Bam Bam’, WHOSAMPLED, https://www.whosampled.com/sample/408737/
Kanye-West-Rihanna-Swizz-Beatz-Famous-Sister-Nancy-Bam-Bam
[https://perma.cc/HBL5-84H2].
88
See, e.g., Samples of When the Levee Breaks by Led Zeppelin, WHOSAMPLED,
https://www.whosampled.com/Led-Zeppelin/When-the-Levee-Breaks/sampled
[https://perma.cc/R2UF-PERY].
89
See, e.g., UGK Feat. OutKast’s ‘Int’l Players Anthem (I Choose You)’ Sample of
Willie Hutch’s ‘I Choose You’, WHOSAMPLED, https://www.whosampled.com/
sample/1201/UGK-OutKast-Int%27l-Players-Anthem-(I-Choose-You)-Willie-Hutch-IChoose-You [https://perma.cc/85JQ-H3M8].
90
See, e.g., Aaliyah Feat. Timbaland’s ‘Are You That Somebody?’ Sample of Jac
Holzman’s ‘Happy Baby’, WHOSAMPLED, https://www.whosampled.com/sample/313684/
Aaliyah-Timbaland-Are-You-That-Somebody%3F-Jac-Holzman-Happy-Baby
[https://perma.cc/Y4B8-XU3E].
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Because recordings embody compositions, industry norms dictate that sample licenses are sought for both the sampled recording
and its underlying composition.91 Typically, the sample license for
the composition might involve a flat fee, as well as songwriter
credit.92 As a result, the new sound recording and its underlying
composition become even more intertwined: the industry’s understanding of the new composition becomes defined, in part, by
the pre-existing sound recording—regardless of the nature of the
embedded compositional material taken along for the ride.93
91

See Jamie Davis-Ponce, Borrowing Success: How to Legally Sample Music,
SONICBIDS BLOG, http://blog.sonicbids.com/borrowing-success-how-to-legally-samplemusic [https://perma.cc/4QA8-R97X]; Music Sampling and Beat Licensing, TUNECORE,
https://www.tunecore.com/guides/music-sampling-and-beat-licensing-101
[https://perma.cc/Y7ZV-ZQFX]. While unlikely, it is technically possible to lawfully
sample a recording without authorization from the compositional rightsholders. See
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 2004). An uncleared sample is an
infringement of the sound recording copyright. See Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner
Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005).
92
See Cornell, supra note 86. As is typically the case with songwriter splits, there are
no hard and fast rules, but rather a fluid bargaining process. See id.
93
Further complications may arise as the emerging retail markets for musical stems,
beats, and sound libraries become more influential. See Unbundling the Song: Inside the
Next Wave of Recorded Music’s Disruption, FORBES (May 13, 2018, 7:44 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cheriehu/2018/05/13/unbundling-the-song-inside-the-nextwave-of-recorded-musics-disruption/#350689079cae [https://perma.cc/HB2M-C4XR];
Carmin Chappell, ‘Old Town Road’ is Now the Longest-Running No. 1 Song—and the Beat
Lil Nas X Used Only Cost $30, CNBC (July 23, 2019, 2:40 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2019/07/23/lil-nas-x-bought-the-beat-used-in-old-town-road-for-30-on-beatstars.html
[https://perma.cc/37E6-XHPQ]; Dani Deahl, Justin Bieber Was Accused of Stealing a
Melody, But It’s Actually a Royalty-Free Sample You Can Buy Online, VERGE (Feb. 17,
2020, 11:45 AM) https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/17/21140838/justin-bieber-changesrunning-over-asher-monroe-synergy-splice-sample-melody
[https://perma.cc/UAV5DDND]; Jacob Goldstein, How to Make It in the Music Business, PLANET MONEY (Sept.
15, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2017/09/15/551236508/episode-794-howto-make-it-in-the-music-business [https://perma.cc/KR7F-U2AX]. Incidentally, this
shared sourcing of production material is just part of a general empirical trend towards
sonic homogeneity in modern popular music. See, e.g., Chris Wickham, Pop Music Too
Loud and All Sounds the Same: Official, REUTERS (July 26, 2012, 9:04 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-science-music/pop-music-too-loud-and-all-soundsthe-same-official-idUSBRE86P0R820120726 [https://perma.cc/V7UR-V3MC]; Greg
Milner, They Really Don’t Make Music Like They Used To, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/opinion/what-these-grammy-songs-tell-us-aboutthe-loudness-wars.html [https://perma.cc/UN25-7GWN]. The sonic homogeneity trend,
combined with judicial reliance upon recordings, could further stoke the substantial
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II. FORMATION: THE JUDICIAL COLLISION OF COMPOSITION AND
SOUND RECORDING
Part II of this Note outlines how the creative and business
developments discussed in Part I have filtered into the courtroom.
Part II.A tracks evolving judicial understandings of the “composition.” Part II.B explores administrative variables affecting the scope
of compositional copyright protection. Part II.C provides
a structural overview of infringement proceedings and lays the
evidentiary foundation for the sound recording-specific discussions
at issue in this Note. Finally, Part II.D dissects recent composition
infringement proceedings where sound recording rulings have
taken center stage.
A. Judicial Conceptions of “Composition”
For much of American history, the legal definition of the musical composition was effectively limited to the work’s melody.94 This
view permeated nineteenth-century case law.95 It followed, then,
that a musical work could only infringe another when “to the ear of
the average person the two melodies sound . . . the same.”96 While

similarity flames. Still, as these headlines illustrate, there is a tendency for critics to
overstate the homogeneity trend, and to conflate sonic and compositional homogeneity;
there is separate, less stark, evidence of increasing pop compositional homogeneity. See,
e.g., Andrew Thompson & Matt Daniels, The Musical Diversity of Pop Songs, PUDDING,
https://pudding.cool/2018/05/similarity [https://perma.cc/V6MT-GF3U].
94
Id. at 1863; see also NIMMER, supra note 25, § 2.05[B] (“Melody is, of course, the
usual source of protection for musical compositions.”); Margit Livingston & Joseph
Urbinato, Copyright Infringement of Music: Determining Whether What Sounds Alike Is
Alike, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 227, 278 (2013) (“[M]elody [generally] drives the
infringement bus.”).
95
See Fishman, supra note 15, at 1869 (“Consciously or not, courts adopted the view of
nineteenth-century European music theorists and critics who saw melody as a musical
work’s aesthetic core.”); see, e.g., N. Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F.
Supp. 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (“It is the arrangement or succession of musical notes,
which are the finger prints of the composition, and establish its identity.”); Jollie v. Jaques,
13 F. Cas. 910, 913 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (contrasting the “genius” of melody creation with
the “mechanic” nature of accompaniment).
96
Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 877 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910), aff’d, 183 F. 107 (2d Cir. 1910)
(emphasis added).
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outlier cracks in this policy occasionally formed,97 the judicial fixation on melody persisted for many decades after the advent of recorded music.98 Gradually, however, courts increasingly validated infringement claims that extended beyond melody and into melodyadjacent elements such as harmony and rhythm.99 This seemingly
inconsequential shift presaged the modern blurring of the composition/recording dichotomy.
1. Compositions v. Recordings
Philosophically, a sound recording forms an uneasy bond with
the composition it embodies; it is simultaneously a “terminal and
canonical version of [the] composition” while also presenting, in
fact, a “limited representation of [that] composition.”100 On the one
hand, any single composition can be recorded, arranged, and
adapted in an infinite number of ways.101 On the other, most commercially successful compositions tend to be overwhelmingly
associated with a single recording.102
Functionally, recordings have provided countless more variables
for would-be copiers to parrot. While nineteenth-century putative
infringers were generally restricted to the limited confines
of sheet music, modern proceedings typically involve putative
infringers with access to widely disseminated, complex sound
97

See, e.g., Fred Fisher, Inc., v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 145–47 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)
(holding that a justiciable infringement claim could arise from a copying of the “‘ostinato,’
or constantly repeated figure” in the accompaniment alone).
98
See, e.g., King, 105 F. Supp. at 400 (defending its focus on melody on the grounds
that the possibilities among arrangement variables such as tempo, rhythm, and harmony
had either “been long since exhausted” or had entered the public domain).
99
See, e.g., Tempo Music, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 838 F. Supp. 162, 168 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (rejecting the assertion “that harmony can never be the subject of copyright” in a
dispute over authorship of an alternate version—with a revised melody and no lyrics—of
the Duke Ellington standard “Satin Doll”); see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, A Musical
Work Is a Set of Instructions, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 467, 498 (2014) (construing infringement
inquiries as typically being limited to “melody, which is typically given primary
consideration, and to a lesser extent harmony and rhythm.”).
100
Tod Machover & Charles Holbrow, Toward New Musics: What the Future Holds for
Sound Creativity, NPR (July 26, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/26/
745315045/towards-new-musics-what-the-future-holds-for-sound-creativity
[https://perma.cc/K2PH-NX3G].
101
See id.
102
See id.
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recordings embodying the compositions at issue.103 Accordingly,
these defendants may have mimicked an array of elements present
in a plaintiff’s recording that may not appear in any written reduction, such as performance expression, sonic timbre, production
effects, and nuanced instrumental arrangements. Consequently,
courts have been left to decide which of these elements are legally
part of the underlying composition, and which are irrelevant to a
claim of composition infringement. The doctrine emerging from
these efforts is anything but straightforward.
2. Modern Doctrine
While there is general consensus that any given sound recording
contains elements that fall outside the scope of the composition it
embodies,104 the next step—surveying the border between the two
copyrights—becomes trickier. Broadly speaking, courts view the
composition copyright as encompassing “the generic sound that
would necessarily result from any performance of the piece.”105
Conversely, a sound recording consists of the “sound produced by
the performer’s rendition of the musical work.”106
Writing in pre-Blurred Lines 2011, Professor Jamie Lund
referred to the traditional conception of composition as a bundle of
“rhythm, harmony, and melody” as the “dominant rule.”107 She
acknowledged, however, “passing references to the contrary” and

103

See infra Part II.D.
See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 25, § 2.05[A] (“[I]t stretches matters too far to conclude
that everything on the recording forms part of the musical composition.”).
105
Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 349 F.3d
591 (9th Cir. 2003), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 388 F.3d 1189
(9th Cir. 2004), and aff’d, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004).
106
Id. (citing NIMMER, supra note 25); see Dustin Mets, Did Congress Protect the
Recording Industry into Competition? The Irony of the Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV 371, 372–73 (1997); Lund, supra note 26, at 145.
107
Lund, supra note 26, at 144; see, e.g., Rose v. Hewson, No. 17–CV–1471 (DLC),
2018 WL 626350, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2018) (dismissing an infringement claim
brought against U2, based on allegedly similar guitar solos: “a court considers only a song’s
composition—the notes, rhythm, and harmony, for example—and does not consider
elements of performance of the composition, like the skill with which the composition is
played.”). Even after Blurred Lines, this approach persisted: “The way things have always
worked, the story goes,” wrote Professor Joseph Fishman in 2018, “only tunes and words
are explicitly covered.” Fishman, supra note 15, at 1872.
104

1336

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXX:1311

cited to the court’s contention in Swirsky v. Carey that “[o]ther
courts have taken account of additional components of musical
compositions, including melody, harmony, rhythm, pitch, tempo,
phrasing, structure, chord progressions, and lyrics.”108 To that end,
while some courts have expressly denied protection to performance
elements present on a recording, such as the timbre and performance
techniques of a recorded flute,109 at least one court has declined
to consider any element of a recording to be outside the scope of
compositional protection.110
Meanwhile, recent cases have accelerated the effective expansion of the legal bounds of the composition.111 Led by Blurred Lines,
they have illuminated the reality that “what the law means when it
says ‘music’ . . . is no longer anywhere near as uniform as the popular condemnation of the [Blurred Lines] outcome would suggest.”112 Prospective plaintiffs have taken notice and asserted claims
far adrift from the traditional ‘“words and melody’” paradigm.113
3. Protectable, Unprotectable, or “Constellation”
Despite a wealth of case law on the topic, no set definition has
emerged to distinguish protectable elements of a composition from
musical elements that are not protectable. Protectable elements may
include “melodic lines, harmonic lines, and percussive parts,” along
with original combinations of these elements and other elements that
108

Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2004), as amended on denial of reh’g
(9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2004) (reversing the district court’s summary judgment for defendants—
Mariah Carey, and her co-writers—on the work “Thank God I Found You,” who were
alleged to have copied the chorus of “One of Those Love Songs,” as performed by Xscape).
The court also noted that “commentators have opined that timbre, tone, spatial
organization, consonance, dissonance, accents, note choice, combinations, interplay of
instruments, basslines, and new technological sounds can all be elements of a musical
composition.” Id.
109
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1191–94 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district
court’s summary judgment for defendants, the Beastie Boys, whose record “Pass The Mic”
had included a flute sample, for which a sound recording—but not a composition—sample
license had been secured). In finding no “substantial” copying of the composition, the court
distinguished the recorded flautist’s “highly developed performance techniques” from “a
generic rendition of the composition.” Id.
110
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009).
111
See infra Part II.D.
112
Fishman, supra note 15, at 1868–69.
113
See id. at 1890.
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are not protectable on their own.114 Meanwhile, “musical concepts,
musical motifs, or trite or commonplace musical expressions” are
not protectable.115 Nor, at least doctrinally, can protection extend to
musical styles or genres.116 In practice, the precise line between protectable and unprotectable expression is “largely a matter of fact to
be decided by the jury.”117
While compilations of otherwise unprotectable elements may receive protection,118 there is no clear threshold for what constitutes a
protectable critical mass of otherwise unprotectable elements.119
The boundaries become especially difficult to navigate in modern
infringement cases involving recorded works whose aesthetic
impacts combine different kinds of elements that may not be individually protectable. For example, the Blurred Lines claim120
primarily centered around what the Gaye estate’s expert referred to
as “constellations” of melodic similarities—some of which may
have been too commonplace or fleeting to be individually pro-

114

Social Justice, supra note 66, at 7–8; see also 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON
COPYRIGHT § 3:93 (last updated Sept. 2019); Brauneis, supra note 30, at 16 (“[I]n many of
the cases in which courts articulated a definition of musical works in terms of a finite list
of elements, they were not rejecting other elements [but rather] articulating what they were
used to seeing in thinly notated sheet music or lead sheets.”).
115
Maureen Baker, Note, La(w)—A Note to Follow So: Have We Forgotten the Federal
Rules of Evidence in Music Plagiarism Cases?, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1583, 1590 (1992).
116
See Madison, supra note 7, at 193.
117
See Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482, 485 (9th Cir. 2000)
(affirming a jury verdict that the Michael Bolton hit “Love is a Wonderful Thing” had
infringed a “unique compilation of [five unprotectable] elements” from the Isley Brothers
work of the same name).
118
Id. at 485–86 (“Each note in a scale, for example, is not protectable, but a pattern of
notes in a tune may earn copyright protection.”).
119
This has not prevented folklore from arising among musicians regarding the existence
of a mythical bright line separating innocuous influence from infringement. See, e.g., Janet
Fries & Jennifer T. Criss, Debunking Copyright Myths, 11 LANDSLIDE 35, 37 (2019); D.
Pinter, Plagiarism or Inspiration?, SOUNDSCAPES (Sept. 2015), http://www.icce.rug.nl/
~soundscapes/VOLUME18/Plagiarism_or_inspiration.shtml
[https://perma.cc/PKR9S8K3]; Is There a “Four Note” Rule that Defines Plagiarism in Music?, STACK
EXCHANGE,
https://musicfans.stackexchange.com/questions/5080/is-there-a-four-noterule-that-defines-plagiarism-in-music/5093 [https://perma.cc/VMW5-C5BS].
120
See infra Part II.D.
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tectable—and arrangement devices such as basslines, percussive elements, keyboard parts, and background vocals.121
B. Scope of Protection
Separate from the debate over which species of musical
expression can conceivably be protectable, a distinct inquiry
addresses the extent to which a specific composition’s protection is
constrained by the information its copyright registration conveys.
The administrative rules governing registration procedures began to
change with the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976.122 Nearly five
decades later, the doctrinal significance of those changes
remains unsettled.
1. Pre-1978 and Post-1978 Copyright Office Regulation
Prior to the 1976 Act, which became effective January 1,
1978,123 a musical composition “could receive federal copyright
protection either through registration and submission of a deposit
copy [with the Copyright Office] or through publication.”124 The
purpose of the deposit copy is to allow the Copyright Office, and the
public, “to identify the work in which the registrant claims a copyright”125 and “to ascertain precisely what [is] the subject of copyright.”126 Before the 1976 Act, the Copyright Office did not accept
sound recordings as deposit copies to substantiate the registration of
their underlying compositions.127

121

See Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018). The doctrine of scènes à
faire precludes protection for “the indispensable or standard aspects of a work.” Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 274 (6th Cir. 2009).
122
17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2018).
123
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–553, 90 Stat. 2541.
124
Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1132 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc
granted sub nom. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh’g
en banc sub nom. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808 (9th Cir.
Mar. 9, 2020) (“[D]istributing phonorecords did not constitute publication under the 1909
Act.”).
125
Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1161–63 (1st Cir.
1994), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010).
126
See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808, at *7 (9th Cir. Mar.
9, 2020) (quoting Merrell v. Tice, 104 U.S. 557, 561 (1881)).
127
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 3,
Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2019) (Nos. 16–56057, 16–56287), 2019
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After Congress extended copyright protection to sound recordings, it also provided that composers could now submit sound
recordings as deposit copies for their composition copyright registrations.128 Thus, although recordings and compositions formed two
discrete, self-contained types of intellectual property, one could
now be used to substantiate the other at the Copyright
Office.129 With that step, the gradual industry comingling of the two
foundational formats of musical creativity found its statutory corollary. This was no mere formality: in 1978, 14% of musical work
registrations were accompanied by sound recording deposit copies.130 By 2012, that number had risen to 77%.131
The precise legal significance of the deposit copy remains an
open issue—one directly implicated in contemporary proceedings,132 and only just recently settled for the first time in the Ninth
Circuit.133 The central question for pre-1978134 works concerns the
extent to which copyright protection is limited to the four corners of
the written deposit copy. By extension, a related inquiry concerns
the extent to which elements that are present in the recording, but
not in the written deposit copy, may factor into an infringement
claim. Though seemingly limited in scope, this inquiry operates
as a proxy for a more fundamental question that applies to all
recorded works, regardless of era: where does composition end and
sound recording begin?

WL 3992659 (arguing that the deposit copy should define the scope of protection for
unpublished works under the 1909 Act). Because “distributing sound recordings did not
constitute publication under the 1909 Act,” musical works were only considered published
for copyright purposes “if the sheet music also was published.” Skidmore, 2020 WL
1128808, at *7.
128
Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1132 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 407–08 (1976)).
129
See id.
130
See Brauneis, supra note 30, at 28.
131
See id. (adding that seventeen percent were accompanied by sheet music, and the
remaining six percent by text/lyrics only).
132
See infra Part II.D.
133
See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar.
9, 2020).
134
The inflection point is January 1, 1978, the date the Act became effective. Copyright
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–553, 90 Stat. 2541.
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2. The Deposit Copy Question
For popular music works, written deposit copies often take the
form of “lead sheets.” These simplified reductions typically communicate a work’s core vocal melody lines, chord progressions, and
other prominent instrumental parts such as bass lines, in addition to
“performance directions such as ‘moderate swing’” and other indicia “designed to be used by professional performers who know how
to interpret and extrapolate from them.”135
Courts have typically ascribed significant weight to deposit
copies for pre-1978 works. Writing in pre-Blurred Lines 2014,
Professor Robert Brauneis noted that “[d]uring the era that federal
copyright required fixation of musical works in written notation
[i.e., pre-1978], the legal concept of the musical work was . . . limited to the elements represented in that notation.”136 Accordingly,
performance elements falling outside of the notated reduction were
outside of the scope of protection.137 The district court in Blurred
Lines conformed to this understanding. It held that the deposit
copy—including elements “implied,”138 but not explicitly notated
therein—defined the scope of protection for “Got to Give It Up.”139
In upholding the bulk of the jury’s verdict, the Ninth Circuit panel
“accept[ed], without deciding, the merits of the district court’s ruling” on the deposit copy issue.140 Only a few years later, the Ninth

135

Social Justice, supra note 66, at 22 (suggesting that “[n]o musician believes” that a
lead sheet reflects the entirety of a modern pop song). But see Brief of Amici Curiae 212
Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and Producers in Support of Appellants at 15, 17,
Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nos. 15–56880, 16–55089, 16–55626),
2016 WL 4592129 (warning that broadening compositional copyright protection beyond
the type of information notated on a written score would chill creativity: “If copyright were
to extend [beyond melody, to] the ‘feel’ of a song . . . we lose the next disco, the next
Motown, the next batch of protest songs.”).
136
Brauneis, supra note 30, at 18.
137
See id.
138
Musicians, supra note 135, at 4–5 (arguing that the district court “emasculated” its
ruling limiting protection to the deposit copy by allowing the Gaye estate’s expert to testify
as to elements present in the sound recording that she attested were “implied in the deposit
copy”).
139
Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018).
140
Id.
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Circuit would revisit the same question—and arrive at the same
answer—in Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin.141
3. Creators’ Consensus
From their bird’s eye view, floating above doctrinal weeds and
bureaucratic policies, songwriters and musicians—“at least those
who have been speaking with the press”—are united in expressing
“incredulity at the notion that non-melodic elements can be propertized.”142 This “prevailing belief” among creators that a composition
is “little more than its tune” closely resembles the traditional inclination to limit the composition to its notation-friendly melodic, harmonic, and lyrical elements.143 Creators in the recorded music space
“have gotten used to recreating existing beats and backing tracks,”
secure in their belief that it is “copying the melodies that brings
trouble.”144 When plagiarism accusations pertain to production
elements, their “reflexive” defense is to say “our melodies are different.”145 Or, per Pharrell Williams: “Look at the sheet music!”146
C. Infringement Proceedings
When alleging infringement of a composition, the two basic
elements a plaintiff must prove are: (1) that the plaintiff owns or
controls the applicable copyright (this is often uncontested)147 and
(2) that the defendant copied protected elements of that work.148

141

2020 WL 1128808, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2020) (holding definitively, in an en banc
opinion, that the scope of copyright for unpublished pre-1978 works is “defined by the
deposit copy”); see infra Part II.D.
142
Fishman, supra note 15, at 1872–73; see also infra notes 231–39 and accompanying
text.
143
See id. at 1869; SEABROOK, supra note 64, at 201 (confidently articulating the widely
held belief among creators that “beats and chord progressions can’t be protected under the
existing copyright laws, which recognize only the melody and lyrics.”).
144
Fishman, supra note 15, at 1873.
145
Id.
146
PAUL LESTER, IN SEARCH OF PHARRELL WILLIAMS 192 (Omnibus Press 2015); see also
Dan Rys, Pharrell Has Found His Happy Place in the Mainstream, XXL (Mar. 4, 2014),
https://www.xxlmag.com/news/2014/03/pharrell-found-happy-place-mainstream/
[https://perma.cc/B3KB-KJJF].
147
See Madison, supra note 7, at 153.
148
See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 274 (6th Cir.
2009).
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Copying is typically proven through circumstantial evidence showing (1) that the defendant had access149 to the allegedly infringed
work and (2) that the defendant’s work and the plaintiff’s work are
“substantially similar.”150
1. Substantial Similarity
While the various circuit approaches supply their own idiosyncrasies, on the balance, their resemblances outweigh their differences. First, “[s]ubstantial similarity is generally a question of fact
for a jury.”151 Second, summary judgment is typically “frowned
upon.”152 Finally, the leading circuits153—the Second and Ninth

149

To show access, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had a “reasonable
possibility” of encountering the alleged infringed work, usually either through
circumstantial evidence placing the defendant in proximity to the plaintiff’s work, or as is
common in music cases, because the plaintiff’s work has been “widely disseminated.” See
Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482 (9th Cir. 2000). Some circuits have
employed an “inverse ratio rule,” whereby a greater showing of access reduces the requisite
level of similarity. See id. at 486. However, the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Stairway
to Heaven to join several other circuits in shuttering the “inverse ratio rule” is likely to
have a significant impact on the relationship between access and similarity in future
infringement cases. See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808, at
*11–13 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2020); see also Eriq Gardner, Led Zeppelin Wins Latest ‘Stairway
to Heaven’ Copyright Fight, BILLBOARD (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.billboard.com/
articles/business/9330743/led-zeppelin-stairway-heaven-copyright-dispute-appeals
[https://perma.cc/P4WG-6H8F] (predicting that the decision “will likely become a new
standard in copyright infringement cases and may be presented to the Supreme Court.”);
Bobby Owsinski, Led Zeppelin’s New Copyright Win Might Change How Courts View
Infringement, MUSIC 3.0 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://music3point0.com/2020/03/11/stairwayinfringement [https://perma.cc/L42X-FXBF] (discussing the decision’s potential effect on
future infringement cases).
150
See id. at 481.
151
See, e.g., Hogan v. DC Comics, 48 F. Supp. 2d 298, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also
Madison, supra note 7, at 154.
152
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980).
153
As the respective homes of music industry hubs New York and California, these
circuits hear the most music copyright cases. See Infringement Resource, supra note 18;
All Sectors: County Business Patterns by Legal Form of Organization and Employment
Size Class for U.S., States, and Selected Geographies: 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=&g=0100000US.04000.001&t=Employment&tabl
e=CB1700CBP&tid=CBP2017.CB1700CBP&n=512230&hidePreview=true&vintage=2
017&cid=EMP&lastDisplayedRow=36 [https://perma.cc/LWH5-N4QS] (showing that
California and New York are home to the greatest number of music publishers, as of 2017).
Other circuits use similar approaches. See, e.g., Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 855 (6th
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Circuits—each deploy a two-pronged test: first inviting objective,
expert analysis of the two works,154 and then asking a lay jury to
subjectively assess similarity.155 In both circuits, expert analysis is
typically confined to the first prong.156 The second, pivotal prong
hinges on how the “ordinary observer”157 or “ordinary reasonable
person” would experience the two works.158
2. “Filtering Out”
As a doctrinal matter, substantial similarity analysis is confined
to the protected elements of a plaintiff’s allegedly infringed work.159
Courts must make an effort to “extract the unprotectible elements . . . and ask whether the protectible elements, standing alone,
are substantially similar.”160 This “filtering out” process generally
applies to both the objective, analytical inquiries, as well as the

Cir. 2003); Bruemmer v. Reardon, No. 1:11–CV–988, 2013 WL 12123372, at *1 (W.D.
Mich. Feb. 8, 2013).
154
See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Ninth
Circuit’s “extrinsic” test evaluates “external, objective criteria [and] requires analytical
dissection of a work and expert testimony.”); Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d
477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pasillas v. McDonald’s Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th
Cir. 1991)) (construing the “intrinsic” test as determining whether a lay person would find
the “total concept and feel of the works to be substantially similar.”); New Old Music Grp.,
Inc. v. Gottwald, 122 F. Supp. 3d 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (articulating the Second Circuit’s
two-pronged test: (1) that the plaintiff’s work “was ‘actually copied’ and (2) that the
portion copied amounts to an ‘improper or unlawful appropriation’”); Hamil Am. Inc. v.
GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1999) (defining substantial similarity as whether a lay
observer would “regard [the] aesthetic appeal as the same.”).
155
The Ninth Circuit introduced this approach in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods.,
Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp, elaborating that the “intrinsic” test gauges the subjective
“response of the ordinary reasonable person” to the alleged similarities between works).
562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
156
Id. (“[Under the intrinsic text] analytic dissection and expert testimony are not
appropriate.”); see Baker, supra note 115, at 1594 (“Expert testimony . . . is relevant only
to show how the ordinary reasonable person may hear the compositions in question.”).
157
Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 2001).
158
Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
159
Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1994) (“[T]he
unprotectable elements have to be identified, or filtered, before the works can be considered
as a whole.”) (emphasis added).
160
Griffin v. Sheeran, 351 F. Supp. 3d 492, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Knitwaves,
Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995)); see Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845
(“[I]t is essential to distinguish between the protected and unprotected material in a
plaintiff’s work.”).
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subjective, “ordinary observer” inquiries.161 In other words, the material at the disposal of both expert analysts and lay jurists is supposed to be “filtered” to exclude unprotected material.
As a practical matter, this can prove difficult. Courts must manage an internal tension: on the one hand, they must “attempt to
extract the unprotectible elements from [substantial similarity]
consideration.”162 On the other—in an effort to avoid “excessive
splintering”163—they have also “disavowed” any purported
requirement to “dissect” works into their most basic atomic
elements.164 This tension breeds a problematic circularity. Properly
deferential courts leave the question of a given element’s protectability to jurors, who are tasked with comparing un-“filtered” works
in order to determine which material must be “filtered” from
the plaintiff’s work—only to then ask those same jurors, who
have already been exposed to unprotected material, to appraise only
protected elements for similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s works.165
3. Evidentiary Backdrop
Because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over copyright matters, these sorts of evidentiary dilemmas typically fall
within the purview of the Federal Rules of Evidence.166 For our purposes, the most important of the Federal Rules is Rule 403,167 which
provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more
of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting

161

See Madison, supra note 7, at 154. Here, the leading circuits differ. The Second
Circuit’s objective prong simply evaluates whether copying, in fact, occurred, regardless
of the protectability of the elements that were copied. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,
472 (2d Cir. 1946).
162
Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1002.
163
Mena v. Fox Entm’t Grp., Inc., No. 11–CV–5501 (BSJ), 2012 WL 4741389, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2012).
164
Griffin, 351 F. Supp. at 499 (reiterating the significance of a work’s “total concept
and overall feel”).
165
See supra Part II.A.3.
166
See 28 U.S.C. § 1338.
167
See infra Part III.D.
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cumulative evidence.”168 This is a direct articulation of the balancing test underlying much evidentiary theory: that courts should attempt to maximize useful information while minimizing harmful or
distracting information.169
To a lesser extent, two rules governing expert testimony also
influence the role of sound recordings in composition infringement
trials, by way of musicologist analysis that may flow from those
recordings. Rule 702 provides that expert testimony must be “reliable” and “help[ful]” to the trier of fact,170 while Rule 703 allows for
expert testimony to be based on information that may not, itself, be
admissible “[i]f experts in the particular field would reasonably rely
on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.”171 These evidentiary matters have played a central role in
several recent proceedings.
D. Recent Proceedings Featuring Sound Recording Rulings
Prior to Blurred Lines, modern decisions had already done much
to collapse the gap between composition and performance/recording. Courts in these cases extended protection to, among other
things, recorded drumbeats, rhythmic patterns, guitar riffs,172 as well
as the “musical punctuation” of the recorded vocal performance
of the word “dog” and some surrounding vocal “panting.”173 However, other decisions took greater care to distinguish between sound
168

Fed. R. Evid. 403.
See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (advisory committee’s note).
170
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
171
Fed. R. Evid. 703.
172
See Fishman, supra note 15, at 1889 (citing New Old Music Grp., Inc. v. Gottwald,
122 F. Supp. 3d 78, 97 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (denying defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the drum groove from the recording embodying plaintiffs’
composition could “reasonably be described as the driving groove, or backbone, of the
song”)); BMS Entm’t/Heat Music LLC v. Bridges, No. 04 Civ. 2584, 2005 WL 1593013,
at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2005) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment based
on similarity of rhythmic patterns in a “call-and-response” as embodied on a recording
embodying plaintiff’s work); ZZ Top v. Chrysler Corp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 983, 986 (W.D.
Wash. 1999) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on liability, construing the
guitar riff as embodied in a ZZ Top record as part of the underlying composition).
173
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 276 (6th Cir. 2009)
(affirming a verdict of infringement, finding no prejudicial error in the district court’s
decision to allow the jury to consider these elements—which did not appear in the sheet
music—from the George Clinton record “Atomic Dog”).
169
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recordings and the compositions embodied therein.174 At least one
pre-Blurred Lines court, citing a “significant risk of confusing and
misleading the jury,” invoked the composition/recording distinction
in an evidentiary context by barring the use of a sound recording at
trial.175 More recently, starting with Blurred Lines, three proceedings have touched directly upon this collision of formal compositional protection and functional evidentiary rulings.
1. Blurred Lines
“The majority allows the Gayes to accomplish what no one has
before: copyright[ing] a musical style.”176 This flourish—from the
lone dissenting judge on the Ninth Circuit panel that upheld the bulk
of the district court’s finding that “Blurred Lines” had indeed infringed “Got to Give It Up”—neatly encapsulated the primary criticisms directed at both the district and circuit court holdings.177
However it looked to the outside world, the proceedings actually
presented a somewhat complicated picture. The Thicke Parties
succeeded in preventing the Gaye estate from introducing the full
commercial recording of “Got to Give It Up” at trial.178 They also—
at least formally—notched a major victory in convincing the district
court to limit protection to the work’s deposit copy.179 But the district court, in denying summary judgment, held that there was a triable issue of fact as to what musical expression was actually indicated in the deposit copy.180 As a result, at trial, the jury was given
174

See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2004).
Fahmy v. Jay Z, No. 2:07–CV–05715–CAS(PJWx), 2015 WL 5680299, at *14 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 24, 2015) (ruling on several pretrial motions in a proceeding involving an
allegedly unlicensed sample incorporated into Jay-Z’s hit record, “Big Pimpin”); see
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their First Motion in Limine, Griffin v.
Sheeran, No. 1:17–CV–05221 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2019), 2019 WL 2604571, ECF No. 111.
176
Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1138 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nguyen, J., dissenting)
(“‘Blurred Lines’ and ‘Got to Give It Up’ are not objectively similar. They differ in melody,
harmony, and rhythm . . . . [T]he majority establishes a dangerous precedent that strikes a
devastating blow to future musicians and composers everywhere.”).
177
See supra notes 14–15.
178
Williams, 895 F.3d at 1127 (majority opinion) (adding that the Thicke Parties
“vigilantly policed the admission of testimony throughout trial, repeatedly instructing
counsel to ensure that the experts tethered their testimony to the sheet music.”).
179
Id. at 1117.
180
Id. at 1124–25.
175
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access to certain musical elements that, on appeal, the Thicke Parties
argued were outside the scope of compositional protection.
The district court instructed the jury that it had heard “‘recorded
versions of each work that each side has prepared based on what
each side contends is shown in the deposit copy that was filed with
the Copyright Office.’”181 Thus, it became the jury’s task to simultaneously decide what was present or implied in the deposit copy
(and therefore protectable), and to determine the extent of similarity
between those works, only among those protected elements.182
In affirming the bulk of the district court’s ruling, the Ninth
Circuit majority noted that the experts for both sides “referenced
the sound recording” and “agreed that sheet music requires interpretation,” so “[t]he question of whose interpretation of the deposit
copy to credit was a question properly left for the jury to resolve.”183
On appeal, the Thicke Parties also argued that the district court
had improperly allowed the Gaye estate’s experts to “play audio
‘mash-ups’ superimposing” Gaye’s “Got to Give It Up” vocals
onto the “Blurred Lines” accompaniment, and vice versa, and that
these mash-ups contained the following unprotected elements: bass
melodies, keyboard parts, and Marvin Gaye’s vocal performance.184
On appeal, the Thicke Parties contended that Rule 403 “required exclusion of such evidence”—that the confusion likely to be caused by

181

Id. (quoting jury instructions from district court).
Id.
183
Id. at 1125–26. But see id. at 1149 (Nguyen, J., dissenting) (stating that the Gayes’
expert’s testimony regarding similarities in bass melodies was “of questionable value”
because “when comparing them, she showed the jury the . . . bass line that she had
transcribed from the sound recording” where, importantly, “several notes were different in
the deposit copy”). Citing Rule 702’s helpfulness requirement, the Thicke Parties had also
sought to exclude portions of her testimony that had been based on the “Got to Give It Up”
sound recording. Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LACV13–06004 JAK(AGRx),
2015 WL 4479500, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
184
Williams, 895 F.3d at 1126. See Oral Argument at 1:22, Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d
1150 (2018) (No. 15–56880), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_
vid=0000012297 [https://perma.cc/4E27-BHJG] (“If you filtered out the unprotectable
elements, it would have been a different case.”).
182
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these mash-ups trumped their minimal relevance.185 They emphasized that “any number of melodies . . . could fit over the relatively
simple chord pattern of ‘Blurred Lines.’”186 Relying upon its history
of allowing mash-ups to be performed for juries, and noting that any
flaws in mash-up conception or execution were subject to cross-examination, the Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision.187 The panel “accept[ed], without deciding,
the merits of the district court’s ruling” to limit protection to the deposit copy—the ruling that had precipitated the district court’s decision to exclude the full commercial “Got to Give It Up” sound recording from trial.188 Fortuitously, the Ninth Circuit would get another crack at the deposit copy issue very soon.189
Today, Blurred Lines continues to represent an important disconnect between formal and functional considerations. Formally,
the court actually furthered the more limited conception of the composition that its decision’s creative and industry critics
endorse. However, the court’s permissive “leave it to the jury” evidentiary approach allowed elements of the sound recording to play
the functional role that those same critics fear can unduly sway
jurors’ perceptions of similarity.190 As a result, Blurred Lines highlights the significance of the evidentiary debate within music copyright infringement proceedings, as distinct from the doctrinal discussion surrounding the scope of protection for musical works.
2. Stairway to Heaven
In 2014, a trustee with an interest in the work “Taurus,” as performed by the band Spirit, filed an infringement complaint against

185

Third Brief on Cross Appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees Pharrell
Williams, Robin Thicke, Clifford Harris, Jr., and More Water from Nazareth Publishing,
Inc. at 32, Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nos. 15–56880, 16–55089,
16–55626), 2017 WL 1633159.
186
Id.
187
Williams, 895 F.3d at 1126–27.
188
Id. at 1121 (9th Cir. 2018).
189
See infra Part II.D.2.
190
See infra Part III.B.2.
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Led Zeppelin.191 At issue: Led Zeppelin’s ubiquitous “Stairway to
Heaven” chromatic guitar arpeggio intro.192 The trial primarily
hinged on two issues: (1) access—Led Zeppelin had toured with
Spirit during a period of time when Spirit would regularly perform
“Taurus” live193; and (2) prior art—whether similar chromatic arpeggios had appeared in works prior to “Taurus.”194
The litigation also addressed the novel legal question of
whether, for pre-1978 works governed by the 1909 Copyright Act,
“the deposit copy defines the scope of the copyright.”195 The district
court said yes, and relied on this judgment in barring certain sound
recordings of “Taurus” from being used at trial; the jury ultimately
found no substantial similarity under the extrinsic test.196 On
appeal, a Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the decision to limit protection to the deposit copy, but vacated and remanded based on jury
instruction errors, and because “the district court abused its discretion by not allowing the sound recordings of ‘Taurus’ to be played
to prove access.”197 On June 10, 2019, the Ninth Circuit vacated the
panel’s ruling and issued an order for an en banc rehearing.198 Nine
months later, the full Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict, and
held that the deposit copy does indeed define the scope of
copyright for unpublished pre-1978 works such as “Taurus.”199
191

Copyright Row Over Led Zeppelin Classic Stairway to Heaven, BBC NEWS (May 21,
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-27497950 [https://perma.cc/GAN7QVN5].
192
Amici Curiae Brief of Musicologists in Support of Defendants-Appellees at En Banc
Rehearing at 6, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2019) (Nos. 16–56057,
16–56287), 2019 WL 2996345 (“Like varied colored flecks of paint, arpeggios and
descending bass lines are musical ideas that must remain freely available to composers.”).
193
See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc
granted sub nom. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh’g
en banc sub nom. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808 (9th Cir.
Mar. 9, 2020).
194
Musicologists’ Brief, supra note 192, at 12.
195
Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1131–32 (noting that “Taurus” was registered in 1967, prior to
publication, under the 1909 Act).
196
Id. at 1130–31.
197
Id. at 1137.
198
Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 2019).
199
Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 9,
2020). At the time this Note is being finalized, no petition for certiorari has been filed,
although one may well be imminent. See Letter Addressed to Judge Louis L. Stanton from
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At trial, issues surrounding the use of sound recordings took center stage. The plaintiff moved for the admission of several studio
and live “Taurus” recordings to be played for Led Zeppelin guitarist
and songwriter Jimmy Page on the stand, so that he could then be
asked whether he had ever heard them.200 The district court agreed
that the recordings were relevant for access, but that playing the
recordings in front of the jury would be too prejudicial.201 As a
result, the court allowed the recordings to be played for Page outside
of the presence of the jury, and then for questioning stemming from
his impressions of the recordings to take place in front of the jury.202
This decision was grounded in a Rule 403 analysis.203 The court
construed the recordings’ probative value as pertaining to access
only—because the recordings contained elements falling beyond the
scope of the deposit copy, they were not probative of the protected
elements of the work “Taurus.”204 Therefore, the court reasoned,
allowing the jury to hear the recordings would pose a significant
prejudicial risk sufficient to justify precluding the minimally probative evidence.205
This was a major victory for the defendants; the extent of this
prejudicial effect had been a matter of significant pretrial contention.
In their motion in limine to exclude the sound recordings, the
defendants had stressed the “impossib[ility]” of expecting a lay jury
to both “identify the material and elements that are not in the 1967

Hillel I. Parness, Structured Asset Sales, LLC v. Sheeran, No. 1:18-cv-05839-LLS
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2020), ECF No. 148 (attorney for one of the Thinking Out Loud
plaintiffs, Structured Asset Sales, LLC, reporting that “[c]counsel for the plaintiffs in the
Skidmore case has told [Structured Asset Sales’] principal that he will be petitioning for
certiorari”).
200
Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1123–24. There were also several 703-adjacent issues regarding
whether expert testimony could be based on the recording. See Defendants’ Reply in
Support of Motion in Limine No. 4 and Daubert Motion to Exclude Stewart, Johnson,
Bricklin, and Hanson, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 2:15–CV–03462–RGK–AGR (C.D.
Cal. May 10, 2016), 2016 WL 2771264 (“[T]he reports plaintiff’s witnesses did provide
are fatally flawed because his witnesses base their opinions on elements not protected by
the Taurus copyright.”).
201
Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1123–24.
202
Id.
203
See id. at 1135 n.36.
204
Id. (“Here, the district court abused its discretion.”).
205
Id.
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transcription” and to “disregard those materials and elements” as
unprotected for the purposes of substantial similarity.206 In its
now-vacated remand, the Ninth Circuit panel countered that “the
risk of unfair prejudice or jury confusion was relatively small and
could have been reduced further with a proper admonition . . . that
the recordings . . . were not to be used to judge substantial similarity.”207 The en banc Ninth Circuit disagreed: it deemed the trial
court’s exclusion of the sound recording proper “[t]o prevent the
jury from making an erroneous comparison for determining substantial similarity.”208
Like Blurred Lines before it, the Stairway to Heaven proceedings highlight the importance of evidentiary concerns, distinct from
their adjacent doctrinal questions. Even where there is agreement—
as there was here—among the trial and appellate courts regarding
the significance of the deposit copy, judicial perspectives vary
regarding how to manifest those rulings in the courtroom. When
should recordings be barred entirely? When are other precautions,
such as limiting instructions to the jury, sufficient? Indeed, given the
doctrinal consensus between the trial and appellate courts on the
deposit copy issue, the seesawing evidentiary directives defining the
district, panel, and en banc decisions have together reinforced the
proposition that what jurors actually see and hear matters quite as
much as what they are technically permitted to consider.

206

Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion in Limine No. 3 to Exclude Taurus Audio
Recordings, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, Skidmore v. Led
Zeppelin, No. 2:15–CV–03462–RGK–AGR (C.D. Cal. May 10, 2016), 2016 WL 2771260
(emphasis added).
207
Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1135. But see Brief Amici Curiae of the Recording Industry
Association of America and the National Music Publishers Association in Support of
Defendants-Appellees on en Banc Rehearing at 5, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999
(9th Cir. 2019) (Nos. 16–56057, 16–56287), 2019 WL 3763847 (criticizing the Ninth
Circuit panel’s 403 approach: “[T]he jury was going to get vanishingly little probative
information by watching Page while he listened to ‘Taurus’ being played.”).
208
Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808, at *10 (9th Cir. Mar.
9, 2020) (“There would have been very little, if any, probative value in watching Page’s
reaction to listening to Taurus at the trial in 2016 to prove access to the song half a century
ago.”) (emphasis removed).
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3. Thinking Out Loud
Only a few years removed from Blurred Lines, a second visible
litigation involving a Marvin Gaye classic currently209 awaits resolution—this time in the Second Circuit. Two separate parties with
an interest in “Let’s Get It On” have filed infringement claims in the
Southern District of New York centering around Ed Sheeran’s 2013
hit “Thinking Out Loud.”210 The claims rely heavily on non-melodic
copying; the plaintiffs allege that the two works share substantially
similar basslines, chord progressions, and drum patterns.211
As in Stairway to Heaven, the parties bitterly contest whether
the deposit copy defines the bounds of copyright protection.212 The
two sides disagree on the extent to which the bassline and percussion
elements alleged to have been lifted by the “Thinking Out Loud”
writers are actually part of the composition “Let’s Get It On.”
The defendants argue that the composition is defined by the four
corners of the deposit copy, which does not contain any bass or drum
notation (although the plaintiffs argue that the bassline is
implied by the deposit copy’s syncopated harmonic rhythm).213
Meanwhile, the plaintiffs contend “that the composition is embodied
on the Gaye recording, which is the first mechanical reproduction of
[Let’s Get It On]” and which does contain the relevant bass and
drum material.214
209

This Note is entering its final stages of publication in mid-April 2020.
See Eriq Gardner, Ed Sheeran’s Copyright Battles Are Much Weirder Than Anyone
Can Imagine, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (June 28, 2018, 9:31 AM), https://www.hollywood
reporter.com/thr-esq/ed-sheerans-copyright-battles-are-weirder-anyone-can-imagine1123850 [https://perma.cc/XGM5-EBP7].
211
Griffin v. Sheeran, 351 F. Supp. 3d 492, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
212
See id. at 495–96.
213
Griffin, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 495–96. The parties also dispute how closely Gaye’s
recorded vocal performance mirrors the notated deposit copy melody line. Id.
214
Id. at 496 (denying summary judgment). Interestingly, several of plaintiffs’ pretrial
documents mention other recordings, aside from the two works’ commercial releases,
including a “demo recording of [“Thinking Out Loud”] that Sheeran and Amy Wadge
recorded in Sheeran’s kitchen in England,” as well as a recording of Sheeran performing a
live mash-up in which he toggled seamlessly between “Thinking Out Loud” and “Let’s Get
It On.” See Reply Declaration of Ilene S. Farkas, Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 1:17–CV–05221
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018), ECF No. 85; Exhibit 6, Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 1:17–CV–05221
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2017), ECF No. 67–6 (Plaintiffs’ expert’s initial report, referencing
livia4912, Thinking Out Loud (Lets Get It On) by Ed Sheeran, YOUTUBE (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RxZjVZKVN7k [https://perma.cc/9R6D-MY4D]).
210
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After initially staying proceedings on July 2, 2019, pending resolution of the Stairway to Heaven appeal, the court eventually sided
with the defendants.215 The en banc Ninth Circuit issued its Stairway
to Heaven opinion on March 9, 2020.216 Fifteen days later, the
Thinking Out Loud court granted the defendants’ motion in limine
“limiting Plaintiffs to comparing Thinking Out Loud with the musical composition Let’s Get It On as reflected in the deposit copy.”217
The court also granted—with some qualification—the defendants’ motions seeking to limit the role that sound recordings embodying “Let’s Get It On” may play at trial.218 Citing Rule 403, the
defendants had moved to prevent the plaintiffs from introducing
testimony or other evidence comparing “Thinking Out Loud” to
elements contained only in a “particular recorded version” of “Let’s
Get It On,” or that may merely be “implied” in the “Let’s Get It On”
deposit copy219; and to prevent the commercial sound recording of
“Let’s Get It On” from being performed at trial, full-stop.220 The
court ruled that “[t]he Gaye sound recording is inadmissible in any
way which might confuse the jury into thinking it represents what is
215

Order, Griffin v. Sheeran, 351 F. Supp. 2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2019) (No. 1:17–
CV–05221), ECF No. 119.
216
Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 9,
2020).
217
See Notice of Motion—Defendants’ First Motion in Limine, Griffin v. Sheeran, 351
F. Supp. 3d 492 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2019) (No. 1:17–CV–05221), ECF No. 109 (italics
removed). The court initially denied this motion, but noted that the denial was “without
prejudice and with leave to renew” at the conference that was to be scheduled “within 10
days” following the en banc decision in Stairway to Heaven. See id.; see also Motion in
Limine Denied with Leave to Renew, Griffin v. Sheeran, 351 F. Supp. 3d 492 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 12, 2020) (No. 1:17–CV–05221), ECF No. 120. Although his rulings in Thinking Out
Loud would not technically be bound by Stairway to Heaven, Judge Stanton had previously
stated that “[w]hatever the Ninth Circuit says, it’s going to be damned educational. . . . To
proceed in willful ignorance of them is folly.” Bill Donahue, How Will ‘Stairway’ Ruling
Hit Other Big Music Cases?, LAW360 (Mar. 11, 2020, 10:27 PM), https://www.law
360.com/ip/articles/1252546/how-will-stairway-ruling-hit-other-big-music-cases-?nl_pk=
892fdd10-89d8-4d9c-875a-d936bdc96875&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=
email&utm_campaign=ip (subscription paywall). True to its word, the court reversed
course after Stairway to Heaven. See Opinion & Order on Defendants’ First Motion in
Limine, Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 1:17–CV–05221 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2020), ECF No. 121.
218
See Griffin et al, supra note 217.
219
Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 175, at 9–11.
220
Notice of Motion—Defendants’ First Motion in Limine, Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 1:17–
CV–05221 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2019), ECF No. 109.

1354

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXX:1311

protected by copyright” and that “[t]o that extent, Defendants’ . . .
in limine requests are granted.”221 However, it deferred the details
“until trial.”222 While it suggested that playing or referring to “portions, or the whole Gaye sound recording” at trial presently
“seems . . . barred by Fed. R. Evid. 403,” the court signaled that
“there may arise circumstances or arguments under which they may
be admissible.”223 At the time this Note is being finalized, the precise application of these rulings is yet to be tested.
If and when Thinking Out Loud does proceed to trial—and
perhaps to appeal—it will provide an opportunity for another circuit
to develop case law governing when compositional protection is
limited to the deposit copy, and when elements found only in
recordings may be protected. Importantly, like its predecessors, it
will also provide another test case for how these doctrinal decisions
impact evidentiary rulings—and by extension, jurors’ perceptions
of similarity.
III. STICKSHIFTS AND SAFETYBELTS: POLICY PROS AND CONS
The debate over the use of sound recordings in infringement
trials is inextricably linked with the debate over how to define the
bounds of a given composition. Any attempt to evaluate how probative or prejudicial a piece of evidence is to a compositional
infringement claim inevitably depends on how one defines the composition in the first place. Accordingly, Part III navigates the intersection of policy implications inherent to each issue, while Part IV
proposes a judicial framework that explicitly accounts for their overlap. First, Part III.A enumerates the policy pros and cons of an expanded view of what constitutes compositional creativity. Then, Part
III.B compares the pros and cons of the unrestricted use of sound
recordings in composition infringement trials.

221
222
223

Griffin et al, supra note 217.
Id.
Id.
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A. Pros and Cons of an Expanded Definition of “Composition”
There are many avenues for creative musical expression that fall
outside of what has traditionally been understood to be compositional. Indeed, the advent of modern recording technology has allowed for the proliferation of production creativity to the point that
some argue “more original expression [can] be found, typically, in
the visual and audio recordings of a performance of a song than in
the underlying musical work.”224 What’s more, they continue, in
modern pop music, whether “measured by . . . authorial focus or
commercial importance, production matters as much as the melodies
that are ultimately appended to it.”225
Still, the narrow construction of the composition is grounded in
centuries of musical tradition.226 It continues to define the modern
industrial organization of the music sector,227 and remains ubiquitous among both creators and the infrastructure that supports
them.228 Part III.A explores these, and other, policy arguments surrounding an expanded understanding of the musical composition.
1. Cons: Arguments for the Traditional Definition of
“Composition”229
Arguments for preserving the traditional understanding of the
composition tend, naturally, to be rooted in tradition. But that
tradition represents more than mere complacent inertia—it reflects
creators’ expectations and preferences, and facilitates a predictable,
stable, manageable ecosystem that allows songwriters to feel safe
creating music.

224

Fishman, supra note 15, at 1900; see also Gabriel Jacob Fleet, Note, What’s in A
Song? Copyright’s Unfair Treatment of Record Producers and Side Musicians, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 1235, 1279 (2008).
225
Fishman, supra note 15, at 1900.
226
See supra Part I.
227
Kevin Cornell, Breaking Down Copyrights in Music, TUNECORE (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://www.tunecore.com/blog/2016/12/breaking-copyrights-music.html
[https://perma.cc/NPR8-4MCU].
228
See supra Part II.B.3.
229
This Note will discuss the “Cons” first, because they reflect the incumbent consensus
among creators and their industry agents.
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a) The Expanded Definition Defies Prevailing Industry
Understanding and Preference
Does it really make sense to extend rights designed to protect
music creators beyond where those same creators are telling us they
should extend? The industry has organically evolved a culture that
largely self-regulates around a consensus understanding that a composition is defined, if perhaps not literally by the sheet music
conveying that composition, then by the type of expression captured
in traditional sheet music notation.230 If composers themselves, and
their agents, have always believed that the term “composition”
refers to lyrics and melody, and, to a lesser extent, harmony
and rhythm, why should courts impose a more expansive understanding? Why force a change that strengthens songwriter protection
upon songwriters who are, by near consensus, not clamoring for
that change?
In fact, composers are not merely ambivalent about expanding
the scope of protection governing their core unit of currency; they
are insistent that it is having a chilling effect on their creativity.231
“[Blurred Lines] is definitely striking fear into the hearts of songwriters,” says singer-songwriter Bonnie McKee.232 “We’re all
standing on the shoulders of giants,” warns the R&B artist
Miguel.233 “There’s nothing that hasn’t been done.”234 A group of

230

See supra Part II.B.3.
See, e.g., Jon Caramanica, It’s Got a Great Beat, and You Can File a Lawsuit to It,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/arts/music/pop-musicsongs-lawsuits.html?login=smartlock&auth=login-smartlock
[https://perma.cc/NP6KQTB9]; Michael Donaldson, How Songwriters Got Thrown into a Minefield, SYNCHTANK
(Jan. 19, 2020), https://www.synchtank.com/blog/how-songwriters-got-thrown-into-aminefield/ [https://perma.cc/QLZ8-FHQ9]. But see Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around
Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2015).
232
Madison, supra note 7, at 151. While the en banc Stairway to Heaven decision,
combined a week later with a district court’s decision to throw out an infringement verdict
against Katy Perry, have led some to suggest that “the ‘Blurred Lines’ curse—its chilling
effect—has been lifted,” creator uncertainty is unlikely to evaporate overnight. See Sisario
supra note 18 (quoting Katy Perry’s attorney and noted copyright litigator Christine
Lepera).
233
Associated Press, Miguel Explores Race, Finds New Voice On ‘Wildheart’,
BILLBOARD (July 13, 2015), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/6627416/miguelexplores-race-finds-new-voice-on-wildheart [https://perma.cc/V7YA-N3LQ].
234
Id.
231

2020]

FRE-BIRD

1357

musicians writing as amici for the Thicke Parties in Blurred Lines
articulated their concern “about the potential adverse impact on their
own creativity, on the creativity of future artists, and on the music
industry in general. . . . [T]he verdict in this case threatens
to punish songwriters for creating new music that is inspired by
prior works.”235
Commentators recognize that, practically, there is very little
wholly original creation in music.236 New music is constructed using
“building blocks from a vast historical trove of previously expressed
ideas.”237 This reality endows a natural tension into copyright,
where the line between inspiration and theft is not always clear.238
Courts have the opportunity to calibrate that line wherever they see
fit. Naturally, too permissive an environment risks depressing the
value of copyright through rendering it unenforceable.
Still, it is telling that the very creators who would suffer most
from this deflation are the loudest voices bemoaning the recent
infringement boom. As Professor Joseph Fishman has argued,
perhaps the continued emphasis on melody as the predominant compositional feature “should be justified not as a recognition of its
composer’s creativity but rather as a facilitation of downstream

235

Musicians, supra note 135, at 2 ( “[A] budding songwriter . . . is going to think twice
before he or she writes a song that ‘feels’ like a Marvin Gaye song or any other artist’s
song, always with one foot in the recording studio and one foot in the courtroom.”); see
also Brief of Amicus Curae Musicologists in Support of Defendants’ Renewed Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law or, Alternatively, for a New Trial at 2, Gray v. Perry, No.
2:15–CV–05642–CAS–JC (C.D. Cal. 2018), No. 500–2 (“This confusion and uncertainty,
in turn, is inhibiting the work of songwriters and the American music industry at
large . . . .”).
236
See, e.g., Madison, supra note 7, at 151.
237
Id.; see also Brief of Amici Curiae 123 Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and
Producers, Along With Nsai and Sona, in Support of Defendants/Appellees at en Banc
Rehearing at 20, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2019) (Nos. 16–56057,
16–56287), 2018 WL 9441019 (expressing gratitude and respect for copyright protection:
“No conscientious songwriter wants to copy someone else’s music; nor do they want
someone else to copy theirs . . . . However, Amici also understand that, like the music that
was created before them, their own music will serve as building blocks for future
songwriters.”).
238
See Olivia Lattanza, The Blurred Protection for the Feel or Groove of a Song Under
Copyright Law: Examining the Implications of Williams v. Gaye on Creativity in Music,
35 TOURO L. REV. 723 (2019).
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composers’ future creativity.”239 Indeed, if creators place greater importance on their ability to continue to create in the future than on
securing maximal protection for their existing creations, there is
little reason for courts to construe copyright laws designed to protect
those very creators in a way that expressly defies their wishes.
b) Broader Protection Risks Extending Copyright to Ideas,
Rather Than Expression of those Ideas
Underlying much of the backlash to the Blurred Lines outcome
was the perception that the courts had endorsed extending protection
to a musical style.240 To flirt with allowing protection for
genres/styles/grooves is to imperil the foundational tenet that
“[c]opyright protection applies to original expression of ideas, but
not to the ideas themselves.”241 In Blurred Lines, while “everyone
agree[d],” at least doctrinally, that a “groove” or “genre” represented an “unprotectable idea,” in the eyes of the dissent and many
onlookers, the outcome had the practical effect of protecting what
should have been an unprotectable idea.242 A similar dynamic looms
in Thinking Out Loud.243
c) There is a Fundamental Difference Between
Composition and Performance
Also relevant to the Thinking Out Loud proceedings are the core
creative distinctions between composition and other forms

239

Fishman, supra note 15, at 1869–70.
See Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1138 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nguyen, J., dissenting);
Madison, supra note 7, at 193 (“A style cannot be copyrighted because a style is not a
unique artistic expression.”); Melinda Newman, Top Lawyers on What Songwriters Must
Learn from ‘Blurred Lines’ Verdict, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2015, 12:15 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/melindanewman/2015/03/11/top-lawyers-weigh-in-on-theblurred-lines-verdict-and-what-songwriters-must-learn/#327891976bfa
[https://perma.cc/S88X-M2HH] (“[I]t seemed on its musical face that the groove captured
by the recorded production may have been influential.”).
241
Thomas M. Cunningham, Extending Shaw v. Lindheim: Substantial Similarity and the
Idea-Expression Distinction in Copyright of Non-Literary Subject Matter, 55 U. PITT. L.
REV. 239, 241 (1993) (analogizing this risk to allowing painters of a landscape to foreclose
others from painting that same landscape).
242
Williams, 895 F.3d at 1140.
243
See supra Part II.D
240

2020]

FRE-BIRD

1359

of musical creativity.244 While the workflows and timelines surrounding the composition and recording processes have converged,
the two copyrights still represent two distinct forms of creativity,
and two distinct forms of intellectual property.245 The compositional
process—even when occurring simultaneously to the recording process—is a “deliberative process that allows for trial-and-error editing,” reflection, and revision.246 A recording, on the other hand, captures a series of performances which are “unrepeatable, evanescent,
and aural.”247
Even as modern production practices increasingly resemble
compositional creativity, a finished recording still represents a
single, “limited representation” of the composition it embodies.248
Compositions, on the other hand, are endlessly adaptable to new
contexts and new creative inputs.249 Even confining oneself to the
information conveyed in a typical written deposit copy, there are
244

See infra note 338–40 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.
246
Brauneis, supra note 30, at 8.
247
Id.
248
See Machover, supra note 100.
249
Furthermore, reading those new contexts into the underlying composition unjustly
confers onto the composers the fruits of others’ creative labor. Why should songwriter Bob
Dylan be granted property rights over the iconic “All Along the Watchtower” guitar riff
that first appears in Jimi Hendrix’s cover version, or songwriter Dolly Parton over Whitney
Houston’s divergent, oft-imitated vocal phrasings in her cover of “I Will Always Love
You?” Compare BOB DYLAN, All Along the Watchtower, on JOHN WESLEY HARDING (Sony
Music Entertainment 1970), with JIMI HENDRIX, All Along the Watchtower, on ELECTRIC
LADYLAND (Sony Music Entertainment 1968); compare DOLLY PARTON, I Will Always
Love You, on JOLENE (Sony Music Entertainment 1974), with WHITNEY HOUSTON, I Will
Always Love You, on THE BODYGUARD—ORIGINAL SOUNDTRACK ALBUM (Arista Records
1992). This dynamic exists for any recording of a work, not merely covers. See Fleet, supra
note 224, at 1278 (remarking that, while the “secondary” contributions of producers, side
musicians, and sound engineers are often “viewed as outside the scope of the musical
work” for ownership purposes, “primary contributors are allowed to rely on such
contributions to prove their infringement claims”). Thus, credited songwriters’ copyrights
are permitted to annex the uncredited creative contributions of others. See id. In response
to this disconnect, some commentators have discussed expanding copyright protection for
arrangements, distinct from both the compositions they interpret and the recordings that
embody them. See, e.g., John R. Zoesch III, ”Discontented Blues”: Jazz Arrangements and
the Case for Improvements in Copyright Law, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 867, 872 (2006); Jeffrey
Brandstetter, The Lone Arranger: Have the Courts Unfairly Singled Out Musical
Arrangements by Denying Them Protection as Derivative Works?, 15 ENT. & SPORTS L. 1,
22 (1997).
245
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infinite arrangement and production choices that could accompany
the basic chord progression, structure, and melodic/lyrical material
reflected in the average lead sheet.250 By contrast, any single
recording of a given composition is “static” and “terminal.”251 It can
be affected only by creating a new, derivative sound recording, at
which point it is of course no longer the same sound recording.
d) A Narrower Definition Is Simply More Manageable
But apart from these more abstract issues, the recent proliferation of infringement claims, jarring verdicts, and industry unrest all
suggest that the current expansion of infringement fervor poses
more concrete manageability concerns.252 To the extent that judicial
economy, predictability, and the reduction of transaction and litigation costs are virtues unto themselves, then resurfacing the doctrinal
preeminence of melody may be “the right approach . . . for reasons
different than the [creative] ones that legal decision makers have
historically given.”253 Perhaps a more compelling rationale is,
simply, simplicity—“sacrific[ing] descriptive accuracy for sheer administrability”254 and predictability.255 Because substantial similarity has always “present[ed] one of the most difficult questions in
copyright law,”256 the opportunity to both curb its influence, and
stabilize its unsteady application, may be worth sacrificing some
ancillary benefits.

250

See Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 175.
See Machover, supra note 100.
252
See Kristelia A. García, Improving the Quality and Consistency of Copyright
Infringement Analysis in Music, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (Jan. 24, 2018), https://btlj.org/
2018/01/improving-the-quality-and-consistency-of-copyright-infringement-analysis-inmusic/ [https://perma.cc/9N6E-JGRF] (“[R]ecent litigation in the area has seen
astronomical verdicts, irreconcilable outcomes, and a propensity toward settlement.”).
253
Fishman, supra note 15, at 1904.
254
Id.
255
See Brief Amici Curiae of 19 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petitioner
Led Zeppelin at 13, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2018)
(Nos. 16–56057(L), 16–56287), 2019 WL 2996344 (positing that, given the consistent
historical judicial focus on melody and lyric, “[t]he author of ‘Taurus’ could not have
reasonably expected his copyright to cover more than the notes of the melodic line.”).
256
NIMMER, supra note 25, § 13.03[A].
251
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2. Pros: Arguments for an Expanded Definition of
“Composition”
Still, what exactly are those ancillary benefits? First, fundamentally, an expanded understanding of the composition mirrors the historical convergence of compositional and recording creative and
business practices.257 In addition, an expanded view of the composition could help to allay several inequities exacerbated by the narrow, consensus industry view.
a) A Broader Definition Promotes Fairness
The annals of pop and rock history are brimming with stories of
underrecognized creative input—especially surrounding the
allocation of songwriting credits.258 In one representative example,
Levon Helm, drummer and singer for The Band, described in his
autobiography his frustration with the disconnect between his
group’s collaborative creative process and its concentrated songwriting credits. “When [our album] came out, we were surprised by
some of the songwriting credits. In those days, we didn’t realize
[music publishing] was the secret source of the real money in the
music business.”259 Helm would famously hold a grudge against the
group’s primary credited songwriter, Robbie Robertson, until the
two reportedly reconciled at Helm’s deathbed.260 Helm blamed Robertson’s monopolization of songwriting credits, and of the resultant
passive income, for condemning his collaborators to the lifetime of

257

See supra Part I.
See, e.g., Jenny Johnston, We’re Like a Sad Old Couple . . . Only We Can’t Get
Divorced! The Kinks’ Dave Davies on His Toxic, Lifelong Feud with His Brother Ray,
DAILY MAIL (May 12, 2017, 11:58 PM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article4498022/The-Kinks-Dave-Davies-feud-brother-Ray.html
[https://perma.cc/NH6CSCNU] (quoting the Kinks’ “peeved” lead guitarist Dave Davies discussing his “richer,
more overtly successful” older brother Ray, the band’s sole credited songwriter on the
majority of its output: “Whether he would care to admit it or not, it was a collaboration of
ideas.”).
259
LEVON HELM & STEPHEN DAVIS, THIS WHEEL’S ON FIRE: LEVON HELM AND THE STORY
OF THE BAND 209–10 (Chicago Review Press 2d ed., 2000); see also Lindvall, supra note
73.
260
Sean Michaels, Robbie Robertson Seeks Reconciliation at Levon Helm’s Sickbed,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 2012, 6:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2012/apr/19/
robbie-robertson-levon-helm [https://perma.cc/JWJ8-A8YH].
258
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touring that he believed ultimately contributed to the death of bandmate Rick Danko.261
This harsh dynamic is dulled by a culture that defines songwriting, and, by extension, the compositions themselves, more broadly.
The kind of arranging, workshopping, and instrumental ingenuity
that Helm believed was every bit as foundational to The Band’s creative success as Robertson’s words and melodies262 are much more
likely to be considered compositional contributions today.263 This
allows for the financial rewards of musical creation to be spread in
a manner more reflective of overall creative contribution.
b) Greater Accessibility of Songwriter Credit
That approach could pay extra dividends for historically disadvantaged and exploited groups of musicians. The expansion of
liability could help curtail, for example, an “American cultural history [that] is full of examples of white artists appropriating the
genius of their less privileged black competitors and predecessors.”264 Indeed, for all the notoriety generated by Stairway to
Heaven, Led Zeppelin’s problematic knack for ripping off blues artists may ultimately present a better use case for easing plaintiffs’
infringement burdens.265

261

HELM, supra note 259, at 209–10.
See id.
263
See Sutherland, supra note 80. Others have extended this logic beyond uncredited
instrumentalists to suggest that ownership in musical works should more readily extend to
other classes of music creators, including sound engineers. See Andrew Nietes,
Note, Bringing Swirly Music to Life: Why Copyright Law Should Adopt Patent Law
Standards for Joint Authorship of Sound Engineers, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 1321, 1345 (2019); Fleet, supra note 224, at 1275.
264
Alex Sayf Cummings, The “Blurred Lines” of Music and Copyright: Part One,
OUPBLOG (Apr. 28, 2015), https://blog.oup.com/2015/04/blurred-lines-copyright-partone/ [https://perma.cc/59CB-CJWA]; see generally Toni Lester, Blurred Lines—Where
Copyright Ends and Cultural Appropriation Begins-the Case of Robin Thicke Versus
Bridgeport Music and the Estate of Marvin Gaye, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 217
(2014) (tracing a long, profitable history of white artists appropriating black art, and
offering musicological perspectives on how “Blurred Lines” fits that pattern).
265
See Stereo Williams, Led Zeppelin’s Controversial Legacy: Thievery, Underage
Groupies and the ‘Mud-Shark Incident’, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 16, 2019, 1:33 PM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/led-zeppelins-controversial-legacy-thievery-underagegroupies-and-the-mud-shark-incident?ref=author?ref=author
[https://perma.cc/D95Z262
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Additionally, popular songwriting and production are notoriously male-dominated fields,266 with women of color especially underrepresented.267 A culture of more inclusive crediting may
facilitate equity along gender and racial dimensions. It is worth noting, however, that these disparities exist even as the twenty-first century, with its catchall crediting culture, enters its third decade268;
clearly, crediting more contributors as songwriters is not a complete
remedy, particularly when the classes of creatives enjoying newfound access to songwriter credits are themselves disproportionately
male and white.269
c) Rightsholders Can License Around the New Reality
Meanwhile, beneath the ongoing debate, it is possible that a natural compromise is already surfacing: risk-averse rightsholders, recognizing the increased incidence of litigation in marginal cases,
BEH2]; Paul Resnikoff, Robert Plant and Jimmy Page Openly Admit to Stealing Music,
DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2016),
https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2016/04/19/robert-plant-and-jimmy-page-blatantlyadmit-to-stealing-their-music-led-zeppelin/ (non-archivable website).
266
See Ben Sisario, Gender Diversity in the Music Industry? The Numbers Are Grim,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/arts/music/musicindustry-gender-study-women-artists-producers.html [https://perma.cc/2DMP-BFR2]; Gil
Kaufman, 2020 Songwriters Hall of Fame Inductees Revealed, BILLBOARD (Jan. 16, 2020),
https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/pop/8548194/2020-songwriters-hall-offame-inductees [https://perma.cc/TL5F-94P4].
267
See Nicole Pajer, New Report Shows Major Lack of Representation by Women in the
Music Industry, BILLBOARD (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/
8096196/new-report-shows-major-lack-representation-women-music-industry
[https://perma.cc/3L96-HBH8]. For a cross-section showing under-representation along
race/ethnicity lines in one music-heavy locality, see The Austin Music Census,
AUSTINTEXAS.GOV (June 1, 2015) https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/
Austin_Music_Census_Interactive_PDF_53115.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ9W-ABAQ].
268
Recent reporting suggests that only very incremental progress has been made. See
Tatiana Cirisano, ‘Starting to See Change’: USC Annenberg Study Finds Small Shift
Toward a More Inclusive Music Industry, BILLBOARD (Jan. 21, 2020),
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8548504/usc-annenberg-study-inclusionwomen-industry-gender-gap [https://perma.cc/5KF3-MYH6].
269
See, e.g., Naomi Larsson, Live Music Acts Are Mostly Male-Only. What’s Holding
Women Back?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2017, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
inequality/2017/oct/12/tonights-live-music-acts-will-mostly-be-male-only-whats-holdingwomen-back [https://perma.cc/REY5-H96Z]; Racial / Ethnic and Gender Diversity in the
Orchestra Field, LEAGUE OF AMERICAN ORCHESTRAS (Sept. 2016), http://www.ppv.
issuelab.org/resources/25840/25840.pdf [https://perma.cc/678V-ZN4N].
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have begun preemptively seeking interpolation licenses. The fear
felt among creators is also being felt by their representatives.
Indeed, when Miguel warned about “standing on the shoulders of
giants,”270 it was in the context of explaining his team’s decision to
proactively seek to license an old Smashing Pumpkins song they had
determined Miguel’s new work resembled.271 “Everyone
is being a little more cautious,” an executive told Billboard.272
“Nobody wants to be involved in a lawsuit.”273 So far, predictions
in the immediate aftermath of Blurred Lines that “we are more likely
to see preemptive writing credits given to original composers whose
works are allegedly infringed” appear to have been prophetic.274
This pragmatic, risk-averse response may mitigate any chilling effect on composers’ creativity by lessening their exposure to potential infringement liability.
B. Pros and Cons of Unrestricted Sound Recording Use in
Composition Infringement Trials
Sound recordings play an uneasy role in the debate over what
falls under the “composition” banner. Proponents of the broader definition may look more favorably upon the evidentiary use of sound
recordings, since they encourage a jury to evaluate everything (protected and unprotected). Proponents of narrower protection may
look less favorably upon the evidentiary use of sound
recordings for the same reason: recordings convey more than these

270

See Miguel, supra note 233.
Kyle Anderson, Billy Corgan Explains His Miguel Writing Credit for ‘Leaves’,
ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY (July 22, 2015, 9:27 PM), https://ew.com/article/2015/07/22/
billy-corgan-explains-miguel-leaves-writing-credit/ [https://perma.cc/V4UP-KR89].
272
Ed Christman, ‘Uptown Funk!’ Gains More Writers After Gap Band’s Legal Claim,
BILLBOARD (May 1, 2015, 12:21 AM), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/
6553522/uptown-funk-gains-more-writers-after-gap-bands-legal-claim [https://perma.cc/
VWY4-PWSC]; see also Lynskey, supra note 83 (musing that one cause of the
proliferation of credited songwriters per work “can be found in lawyers’ offices”).
273
Id.
274
Megan Coane & Maximillian Verrelli, Blurring Lines? The Practical Implications of
Williams v. Bridgeport Music, AM. BAR. ASS’N. (Jan. 2016), https://www.american
bar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/2015-16/januaryfebruary/blurring_lines_the_practical_implications_of_williams_v_bridgeport_music/
[https://perma.cc/WU52-YKEZ]. The prediction that there would be “fewer lawsuits
overall in response to this dangerous precedent” appears to have been less accurate. See id.
271
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proponents wish the jury to hear. But in reality, the use of sound
recordings is a discrete issue from the scope of a composition. Sound
recordings will always contain non-compositional elements. Thus,
the evidentiary calculus boils down to any individual sound recording’s usefulness, compared to the inherent risks of exposing jurors
to the unprotected material it communicates.
1. Pros: Arguments for the Unrestricted Use of Sound
Recordings in Composition Infringement Trials
The realities of the modern music industry loom large over this
discussion, and recent history tends to weigh in favor of the evidentiary use of recordings in composition infringement trials.
Increasingly, popular composition happens through the recording
process, not prior to it, with songwriters, producers, and artists
(indeed, the same person often occupies multiple of these titles)
“creating, manipulating, and sending digital music files back and
forth . . . to create a composition that is purely aural and digital.”275
a) Unrestricted Sound Recording Use Reflects Evolving
Creative Practices
As a result of this convergence, the most honest and contemporaneous manifestation of a composition is often the sound recording
that was created as a part of the compositional process.276 Written
reductions of the work are increasingly simplistic, retroactive reconstructions of a pre-existing sound recording.277 There are also
substantive compositional achievements that can only be achieved
through the recording process. Sound recordings, in modern practice, have become a frontier for creativity; rather than striving
to faithfully and transparently capture performances verbatim,
recordings have “become a focus of creative effort and [a] unit of
creative production in [their] own right.”278 From the opening chord
of “A Hard Day’s Night,” to “the use of compressors and noise gates
to create the 1980s gated drum sound,” to the millennial repurposing
of Auto-Tune as a creative apparatus, core achievements that are
275
276
277
278

See Social Justice, supra note 66, at 36.
See id.
See id.
See Brauneis, supra note 30, at 24–25.
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central to the audience’s perception of the composition are increasingly native to recording technology.279 Thus, as composition and
sound recording become more intertwined, it becomes less plausible, and less useful, to separate them at trial.
b) The Limitations and Drawbacks of Written
Reductions280
Even setting aside these new creative frontiers, one need not
search long in order to uncover the many drawbacks of reliance on
written reductions of musical compositions, particularly in the popular music context. At its best, “[w]estern notation deals poorly with
certain aspects of musical expression, like dynamics, attack, and
timbre . . . which are necessarily approximate and suggestive, rather
than precise and prescriptive.”281 Plus, to be sure, written reductions
of pop music rarely enjoy the best of western notation practices.
Because such a miniscule percentage of musical works are ever
embroiled in infringement proceedings, the primary purpose for
which lead sheets are prepared is to serve as commercial charts
which are distributed for use by consumer instrumentalists.282
Unsurprisingly, these reductions are rarely prepared with the due
care that their composer, let alone their composer’s attorney, would
wish for a potentially load-bearing legal document.283

279

See id. at 20–21, 27–28.
The policy considerations discussed in Part III are largely similar for both pre- and
post-1978 works. This is one exception. The influence of written reductions is greater for
pre-1978 works because of the bureaucratic requirement that their deposit copies be
visually notated. See supra Part II.C.3. This cuts both ways: the inherent drawbacks to
written reductions loom larger for the pre-1978 works compelled to rely on them, but so
too do the predictability and clarity rationales for tying protectability to a single, federally
anointed written iteration of the work. See generally United States, supra note 127.
Allowing sound recordings to serve as deposit copies softens these drawbacks, but also
sacrifices some of that clarity; it ratifies the basic tension inherent to using a sound
recording as an inexact facsimile of the composition copyright it embodies. See infra notes
308–25 and accompanying text.
281
Brauneis, supra note 30, at 10 (quoting MICHAEL CHANAN, MUSICA PRACTICA 5–6
(1994)).
282
See Baker, supra note 115, at 1599.
283
See id. (“The information which has been left out may in fact be of such importance
to the song itself that a finding of infringement would not occur if a different reduction of
the music was used.”).
280
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Additionally, because so many songwriters are not literate in formal European musical notation (or choose to compose in other formats), many written reductions that are used as deposit copies are
merely rough transcriptions of recordings of the composition, jotted
down at some point by an industry scribe.284 Thus, “[t]he result
might or might not accurately represent the actual melody and
chords composed, and might include or omit other important, original elements of the composition.”285
Written reductions also fail to do justice to the way in which
music is actually experienced by listeners. “Most listeners do not
break down musical compositions into their significant formal
elements as they listen.”286 Only through experiencing a performance that ties together the separate elements can an audience
access music’s “unique relational system” allowing for a “meaningful experience.”287 This is especially significant for juries tasked
with evaluating the “total concept and feel” of two works.288
Reliance on notated music also spawns an inequitable system
where protection may hinge on the composer’s fluency in European
staff notation. “[This] disfavors those outside that particular music
tradition.”289 In fact, the inability to read or write traditional European music notation is a trait shared by many of the most
successful popular artists in history.290 More insidiously, classes of
creators disproportionately disadvantaged by this formal standard
include black musicians, other musicians of color, musicians from
underprivileged backgrounds with less access to classical music

284

See Social Justice, supra note 66, at 16–17.
Id at 17.
286
David May, Note, “So Long As Time Is Music”: When Musical Compositions Are
Substantially Similar, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 795 (1987).
287
Id.
288
See Jenkins, supra note 7.
289
Social Justice, supra note 66, at 41–42, 55.
290
See, e.g., 7 Famous Musicians—Who Can’t Read Music, MUSIC STUDIO (Nov. 8,
2017),
https://www.themusicstudio.ca/blog/2017/11/909/
[https://perma.cc/N7SSW6CN]. Notably, Marvin Gaye was another member of that club. See Social Justice, supra
note 66, at 40–41 (“If Gershwin could notate for old-fashioned car squeeze bulb horns . . .
why could Gaye not also enjoy protection for . . . cowbells and background voices?”).
285
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education, and musicians from traditions where playing “by ear”
is common.291
Furthermore, beyond the musical accuracy issues discussed
herein, copyright ownership inaccuracies have also resulted from
the removal of the actual composer from the registration process.
“[M]any marginalized composers, especially those of color and outside . . . the European staff notation tradition” were exploited in the
twentieth century by gatekeepers who would either omit the true
composer from the registration altogether, or fabricate phantom coauthors to cut into the true author’s ownership interest in the
work.292 By imposing fewer restrictions on the evidentiary use of
sound recordings, courts can reduce copyright’s overall reliance on
written reductions of compositions, and thus alleviate these problematic symptoms.293
c) Expert Methodology
The Federal Rules of Evidence’s treatment of expert testimony
provides additional support for fewer restrictions on the use of sound
recordings in composition infringement trials. Expert musicologists
are trained in the study and theory of music, an aural
medium. To strip them of the right to offer testimony evaluating musical expression in its native medium—sound recordings—is to deprive them, in the words of Rule 703, of the primary “facts or data”

291

See Social Justice, supra note 66, at 17–18; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Professor Sean
M. O’Connor and Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justice (IIPSJ) in Support
of Plaintiff-Appellant at 29, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2019) (Nos.
16–56057, 16–56287), 2019 WL 2996343 (identifying “inherently American music art
forms such as jazz, country, bluegrass, R&B, and rock and roll” as traditions where many
“first rank” composers did not write in European notation: “[t]heir compositions lived and
breathed” on record).
292
Social Justice, supra note 66, at 16–17. See K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black
Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 368 (1999)
(documenting a systemic and “pervasive history of infringement” of works by black
creators).
293
For a contrary view defending the continued reliance on written notation, see Cronin,
supra note 34, at 227–28 (advocating limiting protection to the “long-established view”
equating compositional protection to “melody, harmony, and rhythm” as indicated in
written musical notation: “Musicians who assemble works . . . from sequences of recorded
sounds cannot access the space, or long-range perspective, of visual representations that
enable the creation of more musically complex works.”).
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that members of the musicology field “reasonably rely on” both inside and outside of litigation.294 In other words, depriving musicologists of the ability to rely upon the precise medium that is so central
to their expertise counteracts a major policy aim underlying evidentiary expert testimony rules: to replicate extrajudicial methodology
in judicial contexts.295
Furthermore, expert musicologists comprise a significant
expense for all litigants—an extra tax atop the other costs and
uncertainties inherent to litigating these types of cases.296 Every restriction on the use of sound recordings, or content contained
therein, erects an additional hurdle that requires additional musical
manipulation. For every sound recording that is barred from the
courtroom, another aural representation of the work, presumably either prepared or performed by the musicologist, must take its place.
This, in turn, further increases both the parties’ reliance on their expensive experts and the experts’ ultimate influence on the outcome
of the trial.297
d) Using Sound Recordings Is Just Simpler
Finally, in many ways, the use of sound recordings in composition infringement litigations is simply easier than the alternative.
Music is an aural art form, and the experience of consuming a work
of music cannot accurately be mimicked via other sensory

294

Fed. R. Evid. 703.
Fed. R. Evid. 703 (advisory committee’s note).
296
See Nicholas Vennekotter, Note, Full Cost in Translation: Awarding Expert Witness
Fees in Copyright Litigation, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1721, 1737 (2019).
297
Judicial skepticism surrounding the influence of expert testimony on copyright
litigation has a long and storied history. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930) (reasoning that expert testimony “ought not be allowed at all”
because it “greatly extends the trial and contributes nothing which cannot be better heard
after the evidence is all submitted”). Per Judge Learned Hand, beyond “cumber[ing] the
case and tend[ing] to confusion,” expert testimony distracts the jury with “the intricacies
of dramatic craftsmanship,” in place of “the firmer, if more naive, ground of [the jury’s]
considered impressions upon its own perusal.” Id. Some modern scholars have explored
the notion of a specialized copyright tribunal, more schooled in music’s formal
complexities than today’s courts and juries, and less reliant upon experts. See García, supra
note 252. This proposal underscores a key point that can be easily misplaced when
discussing the drawbacks of lay juries: they apply to lay judges too. See Lund, supra note
26, at 173–74.
295
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channels.298 It follows that the surgery of dissecting two works of
music, and probing one for similarities to the other, can benefit from
being performed within that same format. There is certainly also
value to the use of visual formats; but of course, allowing audio
comparisons does not preclude other means of comparison.299
Not only is music an aural medium, but it is one that is experienced holistically.300 Listeners do not perceive a musical work as
merely the sum of its parts.301 To the contrary, their experience flows
from “the way in which the musical elements relate to each
other.”302 Ham-handed attempts to separate protected wheat from
unprotected chaff can endanger the entire crop.
Juries also “tend to give more credence to demonstrations that
are easier to understand.”303 Allowing them access to a medium they
are familiar with—recordings—can simplify otherwise complicated
proceedings for them.304 Moreover, because it is unreasonable to expect juries to opine on substantial similarity without hearing some
kind of aural representation of the compositions at issue, any restriction on the recordings that can be used increases the burden on
all parties—especially the party with the burden of proof—to contrive less straightforward aural demonstrations in place of readily
available recordings.305

298

See Brauneis, supra note 30, at 45 (“Courts have frequently noted that music is
fundamentally an aural experience and that one has to engage in acts of listening to
determine whether two musical works are substantially similar.”).
299
See generally Baker, supra note 115, at 1633.
300
See May, supra note 286, at 795.
301
See id. (“Most listeners do not break down musical compositions into their significant
formal elements as they listen.”).
302
Id.
303
Baker, supra note 115, at 1612.
304
Musicologists’ visual demonstrations can be particularly challenging for lay jurors to
follow. See id. at 1608–14.
305
See Plaintiffs’ Objection and Companion Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendants’ First Motion in Limine and Memorandum of Law in Support of Their First
Motion in Limine, Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 1:17–CV–05221 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2019), 2019
WL 2604573 (“To suggest that [not] playing the sound recording is likely to result in less
confusion for a jury is, in a word, absurd.”) (emphasis added).
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2. Cons: Arguments for More Restricted Use of Sound
Recordings in Composition Infringement Trials
On the other hand, the danger posed by making things procedurally easier for lay jurors is that this may then spur their natural predisposition to misconstrue recordings—which are “intended only as
a vehicle for presenting evidence of the underlying musical composition”—as equivalent to their underlying compositions.306
a) Practical Difficulties
For all the “ordinary,” “reasonable” language embedded in prevailing substantial similarity standards,307 attempting to aurally and
contemporaneously pluck only protected, compositional elements
from a recording is anything but “ordinary.” Sound recordings inevitably “invite[] the juror to make the wrong comparison by comparing the sound recordings rather than the compositional elements
underlying each recording.”308 Recordings are simply not honest
brokers of the compositions they embody. A recording is just as
likely to resemble another recording that embodies an entirely
different composition309 as it is to differ from a separate recording
of the exact same composition.310 The resultant risks to judicial fairness read directly out of Rule 403: “unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury.”311

306

See Lund, supra note 26, at 148–49.
See supra Part II.C.1.
308
Lund, supra note 26, at 149.
309
See, e.g., Tyler Cooper, This Is How You Remind Me of Someday, YOUTUBE (Jan. 10,
2009),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pvujgcbaCF8
[https://perma.cc/4DWBNDZV].
310
Compare Vintage.TV, Don’t Think Twice It’s All Right—Bob Dylan, YOUTUBE (June
27, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-Y3KfJs6T0 [https://perma.cc/PXC5GWGZ], with Xenia, Don’t Think Twice, It’s All Right—Kesha (Bob Dylan Tribute),
YOUTUBE (Dec. 10, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mNCEV7ZSNFo
[https://perma.cc/R3U5-Q3ME], and Siegfried Deniz, Frankie Valli & 4 Seasons 10 Don’t
Think Twice, It’s Alright, YOUTUBE (June 29, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=KerQKsX0zlw [https://perma.cc/SW6P-4MCQ].
311
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
307
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b) Jury Confusion
Lay juries are “notoriously ill-suited” to the complexities of musical similarity analysis.312 Many commentators have speculated
that the Blurred Lines jurors, in spite of the district court’s formal
restrictions, were swayed by the two recordings’ stylistic similarities.313 More generally, there is significant cause to be skeptical
about jurors’ ability to parse composition from recording. When pop
records resemble one another to the average listener, it is often due
to production similarities.314 “Melody often doesn’t do anywhere
near as much of the lay listener’s heavy lifting as copyright traditionally assumes.”315 Ultimately, listeners’ ears tend to gravitate
312

García, supra note 252; see also Gabriel A. Radvansky et al., Timbre Reliance in
Nonmusicians’ and Musicians’ Memory for Melodies, 13 MUSIC PERCEPTION: AN
INTERDISC. J. 127, 127–28 (1995) (discussing nonmusicians’ relative inability, compared
with musicians, to focus on specific musical features, disaggregate musical elements from
one another, and “structure their mental representation” of music).
313
See, e.g., Lattanza, supra note 238, at 725 (“[T]he jury most likely found similarities
based on the ‘mash-up’ recording of the songs, which . . . contained unprotectable
elements.”); Madison, supra note 7, at 193 (2019) (“What makes the recordings of ‘Got to
Give It Up’ and ‘Blurred Lines’ sound similar to some listeners is that they have stylistic
similarities.”); Jenkins, supra note 7 (arguing that “it is very difficult to compare ‘total
concept and feel’ without erroneously taking into account all of the unprotectable
elements” present in the “Got to Give It Up” recording, including stylistic elements Gaye
may have “copied directly from his Motown, funk, or disco predecessors,” basic chord
progressions, and other “scènes à faire”). The Ninth Circuit itself expressed this concern at
oral argument. Oral Argument, supra note 184 (expressing the eventually dissenting Judge
Nguyen’s concern that exposure to unprotected recorded elements might “unduly sway the
jurors”).
314
See Fishman, supra note 15, at 1903.
315
Id.; see Carys Craig & Guillaume Laroche, Out of Tune: Why Copyright Law Needs
Music Lessons, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACHES 43, 58 (B. Courtney Doagoo et al. eds., 2014) (“Our ears are biologically
hardwired to believe two violin melodies are more alike than two melodies for two different
instruments.”); Rita S. Wolpert, Recognition of Melody, Harmonic Accompaniment, and
Instrumentation: Musicians vs. Nonmusicians, 8 MUSIC PERCEPTION 95 (1990) (reporting
the results of an empirical study wherein the vast majority of subjects without musical
training “chose instrumentation over melody and harmonic accompaniment as the salient
cue for recognition.”). But see Lindsey R. Williams, Effect of Music Training and Musical
Complexity on Focus of Attention to Melody or Harmony, 53 J. RES. MUSIC EDUC. 210,
216–17 (2005) (showing, empirically, that melody disproportionately attracts the attention
of less musically educated listeners, relative to harmony); Caroline Palmer, Listening,
Imagining, Performing: Melody As a Life Cycle of Musical Thought, 33 MUSIC
PERCEPTION: AN INTERDISC. J. 3, 9 (2015) (describing melody, in a neuroscience context,
as the “primary voice that grabs listeners’ attention”); Gino Stefani, Melody: A Popular
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more towards the “sound-character” of a recording than to its embedded compositional elements.316 Crucially, once the jury has attached “undue weight to irrelevant similarities between the
recordings . . . [t]he proverbial bell cannot be un-rung.”317
c) Jury Manipulation
Beyond the passive inevitability of jury confusion, the risk of
deliberate jury manipulation by musicologists also warrants monitoring. There is nothing particularly sinister about this manipulation;
experts, like attorneys, are retained to rhetorically position their client’s case in the most favorable light. But, uniquely, the musicologist is often the only party in the room fluent in their subject matter.318 This dynamic presents special dangers, which in turn warrant
more vigilant oversight.319
A skilled musicologist can mold many dimensions of a recording in order to maximize, or minimize, its similarities to another

Perspective, 6 POPULAR MUSIC 21 (1987) (noting that melody is the singular “dimension
of music which everyone can easily appropriate in many ways: with the voice by singing,
whistling or putting words to it; with the body by dancing, marching, etc.”).
316
See David Horn, Some Thoughts on the Work in Popular Music, in THE MUSICAL
WORK: REALITY OR INVENTION? 14, 25 (Michael Talbot ed., 2000).
317
Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of their First Motion in
Limine, Griffin v. Sheeran, No.1:17–CV–05221 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2019), 2019 WL
3362228. Although courts may attempt to mitigate these concerns with limiting
instructions (see supra note 207 and accompanying text), both the subject-matter-specific
and broader legal literature are replete with skepticism as to whether these instructions have
any meaningful effect. See, e.g., Madelyn Chortek, The Psychology of Unknowing:
Inadmissible Evidence in Jury and Bench Trials, 32 REV. LITIG. 117, 126 (2013) (“On the
whole, there is consensus that ‘when people attempt to ignore inadmissible information of
which they are aware in making decisions or arriving at judgments . . . they frequently will
be unsuccessful.’”) (quoting Chris Guthrie et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1262
(2005)); Fleet, supra note 224, at 1279 n.211 (“The naive assumption that prejudicial
effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be
unmitigated fiction.”) (quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
318
See Musicians, supra note 135, at 12–13 (“Musicologists speak a language that is
often foreign to judges (and juries).”).
319
Contra supra notes 296–97 and accompanying text.
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work: tempo, key, pitch, arrangement, mixing effects, etc.320 Vintage matters too: recordings from disparate eras evince sonic differences that can allow a musicologist to mask compositional similarities, and vice versa.321 The same holds true for instrumentation.322
Critically, the jury “does not have the required education to evaluate
the relative reliability” of these tactics.323
The manipulation risks are especially pronounced for mash-ups.
For example, the Gaye estate’s mash-up in Blurred Lines “sounds
as if the melody to ‘Blurred Lines’ seamlessly floats over the top of
the accompaniment to ‘Got to Give It Up.’”324 While “[t]o a music
theorist, the mash-up sounds grindingly dissonant,” such technical
critiques might be lost on a lay listener enraptured by mere alignment.325 Indeed, musicologists themselves harbor significant doubts
regarding the general legitimacy of mash-ups as evidence.326 Without rigorous judicial oversight, there is no check on the potential
influence they can wield with recordings at trial.
IV. THE WAY YOU MOVE: INTRODUCING THE “TRIAD” APPROACH
Seeking to respect the historical trends discussed in Parts I and
II, and to properly calibrate the policy arguments explored in Part
320

See Baker, supra note 115, at 1587 (describing musicologist testimony as “typically
designed to obscure or highlight similarities, and to divert the jury’s attention from more
reliable music interpretations”).
321
See id. at 1610.
322
Id. (illustrating that a modern recording of the London Symphony Orchestra, set
against a “little 18-piece ensemble in 1953 with very crude performing technology” can
create the impression of “apples to oranges” even when the underlying compositions are
“apples to apples”).
323
Id. at 1587.
324
Madison, supra note 7, at 193.
325
See id. Experts often offer dueling mash-ups, with a typical plaintiffs’ mash-up
designed to emphasize the similarities between the two works at issues, and the typical
defendants’ mash-up designed to “illustrate that any similarities between the works at issue
can [also] be detected in other modern, pop songs performed in the same meter.” See, e.g.,
Cottrill v. Spears, No. CIV.A. 02–3646, 2003 WL 21223846, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 22,
2003), aff’d, 87 F. App’x 803 (3d Cir. 2004), as amended on reh’g (June 2, 2004).
326
See, e.g., Colorado Law, Colorado Law Live Stream, YOUTUBE (Mar. 5, 2020), at
time stamp 1:27:27, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6-WlVS4DnpY&t=87m27s
[https://perma.cc/Y7PW-AWYY] (Musicologists Dr. Alex Stewart and Dr. Sandy Wilbur
responding to the author’s question regarding the use of mash-ups as evidence).
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III, this Note argues for more stringent judicial monitoring of the use
of sound recordings in copyright infringement trials. As the recent
leading cases show, the real-world implications of these
evidentiary decisions are as functionally important as the doctrine
developed along the way.327 To that end, this Note’s proposal
explicitly links the doctrinal to the evidentiary—it ties the formal to
the functional.328
For the same reasons, this Note also advocates de-emphasizing
evidentiary reliance upon strict categories of protectable and
unprotectable elements within specific compositions.329 Irrespective
of the abstract wisdom of these categories, in reality, the mingling
of composition and recording creativity—particularly in the presence of compilation claims330—has gelded the “filtering out” process.331 This makes it difficult for the protectability issue to have a
meaningful real-world impact on evidentiary decisions. As demonstrated in Blurred Lines, the current approach allows courts, where
protectability is disputed, to leave its resolution to the jury, and thus
err on the side of the jury hearing more rather than less.332 The circularity of this model carries an inherent risk, as explained above:
jurors cannot unhear what they have already heard.333
Instead, this Note advocates acknowledging the ongoing sunsetting of meaningful bright-line protectability rules, and instead
encourages courts to impose a sliding-scale, fact-specific compositionality determination to allocate the relative burdens placed on
each party for evidentiary offerings.334 The three steps of the
327

See supra Part II.D.
For a non-evidentiary proposal, see Professors, supra note 255, at 1, 19–25 (proposing
imposing a “virtual identity” similarity requirement for claims that involve compilations
of unprotectable elements).
329
See supra Part II.A.
330
See supra Part II.B.1.
331
See supra Part II.C.2.
332
See supra notes 165, 181–82 and accompanying text.
333
See Defendants’ Reply, supra note 317 and accompanying text; supra Part III.B.2.
334
See supra Part II.A. For a discussion on how burdens typically operate in copyright
infringement cases, see Lydia Pallas Loren & R. Anthony Reese, Proving Infringement:
Burdens of Proof in Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 621,
632 (2019). Importantly, this Note does not advocate a wholesale rejection of formal
protectability, which remains useful for ensuring that certain elements correctly remain in
the public domain, in spite of their compositional nature. See supra notes 115, 121 and
328
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proposed “Triad”335 judicial approach, for any given contested
recorded element, are: (1) to what extent is the recorded element in
question compositional in nature, or to what extent does the full
recording in question contain non-compositional elements? This
inquiry, in turn, determines the relative burdens placed on each party
in the later steps; (2) in what ways is the given recording, or recorded
element, probative of the composition that is alleged to have been
infringed; and (3) in what ways could the recording, or recorded
element, be prejudicial, confusing, or misleading for a jury’s substantial similarity analysis?
Like Rule 403, Steps Two and Three of the Triad approach
undertake an express evaluation of the probative value versus the
prejudicial risks of the putative evidence. However, unlike Rule 403,
which calls for relevant evidence to be admitted unless the probative
value is “substantially outweighed” by prejudice, confusion, or
delay, the Triad approach contemplates a more flexible burden.336
A. Triad Step One: “Compositionality” Spectrum
In Step One of the Triad approach, courts consider the extent to
which a recorded element is compositional in nature. The more compositional the element, the less onerous the burden faced by the proponent of the evidence to get that element admitted. Conversely, the
less compositional the recorded element, the greater its proponent’s
burden becomes to admit that element into evidence.
An array of non-dispositive factors may be relevant to determining where on the compositionality spectrum an element falls. These
include: (1) the manner of musical contribution at issue (melody,
harmony, performance, timbre, arrangement, production, mixing,
etc.); (2) whether the parties subjectively considered these contributions to be compositional; (3) the extent to which this kind of contribution is typically considered to be compositional; (4) the
accompanying text; Fishman, supra note 231, at 1381 (“A maximalist copyright law shorn
of . . . the scènes à faire doctrine, and other safeguards for borrowing and quotation would
cast a long shadow not just over what society creates but also how society creates.”).
335
The triad, “a chord made up of three tones . . . [,] is the basis of tonal harmony in
music.” Triad, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/art/triad-music
[https://perma.cc/79XV-UDYN].
336
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
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presence, or absence, of this element in other iterations of the work,
including demos, live performances, covers, and written reductions
(deposited and otherwise);337 (5) the identity of the parties that made
the contribution, and whether they are credited as songwriters; (6)
the work’s overall compositional process and chronology; and (7)
the process and chronology through which the element at issue was
added to the recording, and how that process and chronology interacted with the compositional process and chronology. In addition to
this non-exhaustive list, judges may consider whether any policy
implications like those discussed in Part III—particularly social justice considerations such as the presence of racial appropriation or
pilfering—weigh in favor of compositionality.
Excerpts from Ed Sheeran’s Thinking Out Loud deposition provide a useful illustration of several of the compositionality elements.338 Sheeran describes the initial songwriting process undertaken with co-writer Amy Wadge, and distinguishes their compositional creations conceived during a songwriting session at his house
from production elements added later by producer Jake Gosling
during a studio session.339 Sheeran remarks that “the song itself is a
guitar and a vocal. . . . [I]f you put bass or drums or piano on it, that
was [Gosling’s] production . . . not songwriting.”340
Sheeran’s testimony speaks directly to factor (2)—a party’s subjective understanding that the drums and bass were not compositional—as well as factor (5)—the identity and status of the contributor (in this case the drums and bass were conceived by Gosling,
who is not one of the two credited songwriters on “Thinking Out
Loud”).341 It also lays the chronological foundations relevant to
factors (6) and (7).342 The demo recording from Sheeran and
337

Importantly, factors (3) and (4) are the only two that invite expert testimony. The
others are primarily factual inquiries. The Triad method thus carries the benefit of reducing
experts’ influence on the outcome, as well as on the parties’ expert-related expenses. See
supra notes 296–97 and accompanying text.
338
Exhibit 9, Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 1:17–CV–05221 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2018), ECF
No. 67–9.
339
Id. at 6–7 (answering “yes” to this question: “To your understanding, [after the writing
session] you had written the song and the song was complete?”).
340
Id. at 7.
341
See Griffin v. Sheeran, 351 F. Supp. 3d 492, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
342
Exhibit 9, supra note 338, at 6–8.

1378

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXX:1311

Wadge’s initial writing session would also be relevant to factor
(4).343 Taken together, these factors suggest that the drums and bass
are not particularly compositional. Under the Triad approach, then,
were the “Thinking Out Loud” writers to allege infringement against
creators of a future work, they would have to satisfy a higher probative burden (Step Two) to introduce recordings that included
Gosling’s drums and bass, and their opponents would face a lower
prejudicial burden (Step Three) to preclude those recorded elements.
The Triad approach’s sliding-scale compositionality inquiry
begins with a rebuttable presumption that, absent a showing of
other factors, limits the composition to the narrow, songwriterconsensus, melody-centric view. This presumption vindicates
music’s “building block” nature,344 and facilitates new creativity by
promoting simplicity, predictability and stability345—and also by
quelling creators’ anxieties346 surrounding the copyrightability of
grooves, genres, and other core musical ideas.347 At the same time,
by allowing this presumption to be rebutted by a number of nondispositive factors, the Triad approach’s attempted compromise respects the reality that in many contexts, composition and recording
are becoming inherently more difficult to separate.348 It also affords
courts the flexibility to counteract the exclusionary injustices that
can occur as side-effects of the narrower view of compositionality.349 Fundamentally, this middle-ground approach allows judges,
on a case-by-case basis, to link any of the policy arguments surrounding compositionality directly and explicitly to the evidentiary
decisions that so often shape these verdicts.350

343

See Exhibit 6, supra note 214.
See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
345
See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text.
346
See supra notes 230–39 and accompanying text.
347
See supra notes 240–42 and accompanying text. In this way, it operates similarly to
limiting scope of copyright to a written deposit copy, but with the added benefit of applying
meaningfully to post-1978 works. See supra note 280.
348
See supra Part I.
349
See supra notes 259–69 and accompanying text.
350
See supra Part II.D.
344
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B. Triad Steps Two and Three: Probative v. Prejudicial Burdens
The subsequent evidentiary steps for contested recordings/
recorded elements echo a traditional Rule 403 analysis,351 differing
only in the variable burden that they impose upon the parties, as
determined in Step One’s compositionality inquiry. The less
compositional the element, the greater the showing of probative
value (Step Two) necessary to achieve admission of the recorded
element. The more compositional the element, the greater the
showing of prejudicial risk (Step Three) necessary to preclude
admission of the recorded element.
To illustrate: Marvin Gaye’s vocal performance of a melody
encompasses two traditionally compositional elements—a work’s
central melody, and its accompanying lyrics. However, it also bundles performance elements that are not traditionally compositional:
vocal performance techniques, tone, timbre, and vocal production.
Under the Triad approach, a party seeking to preclude admission of
Marvin Gaye’s vocal performance of vocal melody and lyrics—
elements that are highly compositional352—would have to show a
higher risk of prejudice (presumably posed by the bundled, minimally compositional vocal performance and production elements)
than, for example, a party seeking to preclude elements that are presumptively less compositional, such as a production vocal reverb or
guitar distortion.
Additionally, under Step Three, where there is a risk of prejudicial effect, courts may look to whether there are less prejudicial
means of conveying the same probative information. This allows
courts to consider the ease with which an element could be
re-recorded, re-edited, re-mixed, performed live to the jury, or conveyed via other similarly probative means less obscured by
unprotected similarities (or, conversely, by irrelevant dissimilarities
that unduly distract from compositional similarity).353

351

See supra Part II.C.3.
See Fishman, supra note 15, at 1872.
353
This also provides an avenue for courts to factor in the influence, and expense,
wielded by experts. See supra notes 296–97 and accompanying text. Together, these
benefits should outweigh the costs associated with any additional procedural complexity
that the Triad approach may inject into pretrial (e.g. more intricate motions in limine, or
352
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The furthering, under Steps Two and Three, of the middle
ground approach established in Step One allows courts to embrace
the ethos of Rule 403: striving to maximize factfinders’ access to
helpful information, while minimizing their exposure to risky
inputs. Importantly, though, this approach also allows courts to factor other policy arguments into the risks and rewards of admitting a
given recorded element.354
Those risks and rewards will inevitably vary based on the facts
of a specific case. In some instances, for example, the limitations of
written reductions will be so overwhelming, or so unjust, that an
overwhelming risk of jury confusion or manipulation associated
with a recording should be deemed necessary to trump its probative
value, and keep the recording out of evidence.355 Similarly, in some
cases, it may be so practically impossible to convey to the jury a
composition divorced from its recording,356 that a showing of prejudicial risk should have to be astronomical to defeat any showing of
probative value.357 In other cases, it will be so practically simple to
isolate and extract a recorded element, with so little an effect on the
overall aural experience, that a massive showing of probative value
should be necessary to overcome even a modest showing of prejudicial risk.358 Finally, in still other cases, the risks of jury confusion,
or manipulation, centering around minimally compositional recorded elements will be so profound that practically no showing of

dueling expert compositionality testimony) or intra-trial proceedings. See supra notes 298–
305 and accompanying text.
354
See supra Part III. The underlying rationale behind the Triad approach is the
proposition that, if courts exert greater influence at early evidentiary checkpoints, they can
constrain the factfinder’s range of motion, and thereby regulate the entropic influence that
lay jurors’ lack of expertise can exert over verdicts. This model does, though, have the
effect of shifting some of the onus for musical judgment from lay jurors to lay judges, who
are not necessarily any better equipped to make musical judgments. See supra note 297.
This is a valid concern. Ideally, however, by simply allowing parties to present arguments
that go towards the compositionality factors, as well as any surrounding policy concerns,
courts’ initial threshold evidentiary decision would rely less on lay judges’ ears, and more
on their well-practiced ability to balance equities.
355
See supra notes 281–93 and accompanying text.
356
See, e.g., supra note 52.
357
See supra notes 276–79 and accompanying text.
358
Contra supra notes 298–300 and accompanying text.
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probative value can justify admitting the evidence.359 Because these
circumstances will necessarily vary from case to case, the Triad approach offers courts a sensible solution: the flexibility to fashion
their responses accordingly.
CONCLUSION
The policies and infrastructure governing music copyright tiptoe
many inherent tensions. In a perfect world, courts would not have to
choose between expanding protection for creators’ existing works
and facilitating their ability to create future works. In a perfect
world, a simple jury instruction would be enough to ensure that jurors were appropriately influenced by the protected elements of a
composition embodied in a recording performed to them at trial, and
not at all prejudiced by unprotected elements. Of course, modern
copyright governance hardly exists in a perfect world.
To the contrary, copyright provides, by design, a regulatory
compromise between owners and users—between existing creations
and future creators. In order to breathe life into that compromise,
and to adapt with evolving creative and industry realities, courts
must be aware of historical complexities, as well as the many policy
implications inherent to the judicial intersection of composition and
recording. Courts must then, on a case-by-case basis, determine
which considerations are the most significant. Regrettably, the prevailing judicial fixation on formal protectability fails to adequately
navigate these difficult waters. Instead, it has yielded unpredictable
verdicts, an onslaught of opportunistic infringement claims, and a
class of creators utterly bewildered as to what they are lawfully permitted to create. By expressly linking “compositionality” to evidentiary determinations, courts can combine predictable structure with
just flexibility, allowing them to fairly adjudicate immediate controversies, while also encouraging a safe, productive environment for
the creation of new music.

359

See supra notes 305–25 and accompanying text.

